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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit at the European University 
Institute was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as a 
forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 















































































































































































































































































































































































The paper examines the construction of the concept of acceptable 
risk by comparing the approach to regulating nuclear power plant 
safety at international and national levels in Europe. It focuses 
on the European Community and two of its member states, Italy and 
the UK, and Hungary. Their approaches to regulation are related to 
developments in the scientific community concerning the meaning of 
safety. Two themes are pursued, namely the socially determined and 
the probabilistic nature of safety. In particular the method 
examined is that of cost-benefit analysis. It is argued that the 
different tests applied to establish safe standards either 
explicitly or implicitly make a judgement as to the acceptability 
of risk. Safety is modelled as the product of trade-offs between 
risk and social and economic factors. The decision-aiding tools of 
probabilistic safety analysis and cost-benefit analysis provide 
means, albeit flawed in respect of the political nature of the 
values involved, to measure the two dimensions of acceptable risk. 
Their use however enables choices concerning the acceptability of 
risk to be transferred back from the experts to citizens and 
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ACCEPTABLE NUCLEAR RISK: SOME EXAMPLES FROM EUROPE 
INTRODUCTION
Overview
Two themes are examined in this paper. Controversy surrounding 
the regulation of nuclear power plant safety has sharpened and 
clarified certain issues which have much wider implications 
for public policy. To the public demand that nuclear power be 
safe regulators and the industry's leaders have developed the 
concept of "acceptable risk”, that is, nuclear power plants 
are safe because the degree of hazard they pose is one 
generally accepted by society. Hazard assessment techniques 
are used to demonstrate the degree of risk. The very notion of 
safety, it is argued here, has been changed from its meaning 
of a state free from risk or worry. Its new meaning results 
from two processes. One involves the implicit or explicit 
social judgements that underlie the standards of safety set by 
regulatory scientists. The other is the shift from 
deterministic to probabilistic methods for defining hazard. If 
a hazard is defined in terms of probabilities those facing it 
cannot consider themselves absolutely secure from harm.
The focus of this paper is upon the approach and methods used 
by regulators at the international and national levels. 
Specifically a comparison is made between the European 
Community (Euratom) and the national authorities of Hungary, 
Italy and the United Kingdom. Their approaches to regulation 
are related to developments in the nuclear scientific and 
engineering community concerning the meaning of safety. The 
method examined is cost-benefit analysis.
Chernobyl has demonstrated that nuclear safety is a matter of 
international concern. Radioactive contamination spread world 
wide respecting no frontiers. In fact international regulation 
in this area has a relatively long history and Euratom is an 
example both of this and of an international organisation with 
powers to prescribe as well as to advise. As comparators at 
national level Italy and the UK were chosen as each are member 
states of the European Community. Since the exercise involved 
a study of nuclear power plant safety regulation there was an 
element of self-selection, with the requirement that the 
countries chosen have a nuclear programme. The UK has invested 
heavily in nuclear power, whereas Italy's nuclear programme 
has played a more minor role in its national life. Indeed 
Italy is probably going to give up the option of nuclear 
power. So the countries represent each end of a spectrum of 
involvement with this technology. For further comparison a 
non-European Community country was chosen. Although Sweden 
would have been an obvious, and relevant choice, Hungary is a 
nation of the socialist commonwealth and, importantly for a 




























































































Why safety is regulated
The nuclear industry shares with many other economic 
activities the capacity to cause harm. A nuclear reaction 
involves the use of materials (for example, uranium) whose 
innate natural radioactivity has been enhanced and produces 
both heat and substances (for example, plutonium) which may 
remain highly radioactive for extremely long periods - 
sometimes for timescales beyond the experience of any literate 
society. Certain chemical processes may also, of course, 
create novel substances or compounds in forms which are, say, 
toxic or carcinogenic forever. As an industrial hazard a 
source of ionising radiations is of concern since these 
radiations can affect essential components of the body.
Current medical thinking considers that any exposure to 
ionising radiations causes irreversible harm.
At the heart of regulatory policy concerning nuclear safety is 
the concept of "acceptable risk". There is a widespread 
consensus that "health and safety are not absolutes that can 
be defined in a quantitative sense" (Starr, 1985, p97) and 
that "a thing is safe if its risks are judged to be 
acceptable" (Lowrance, 1976, p8). Achieving safety in its 
absolute sense is seen as impracticable.
It can be argued, quite apart from any set of social values 
which makes the community responsible for guaranteeing 
individuals the rights to life - as do socialist aims that 
people should live free from want and flourish under 
conditions of social peace - or of moral systems based upon 
religion, that markets do not operate optimally in this area. 
Modern industrial societies have through health and safety or 
product liability legislation generally sought to end the sort 
of situation (described by Lowrance) which prevailed in the 
USA around 1900 where "workers laboured under their own peril" 
and caveat emptor [let the buyer beware] "strictly governs the 
market" (Lowrance, 1976, p76). In such circumstances workers 
and consumers can only obtain compensation for irreversible 
harm if the labour and insurance markets are not undermined by 
people, perhaps through desperation, willing to take higher 
risks. Moreover the dead, the unborn and others not in paid 
economic activity cannot directly affect the market.
As a result few dissent from applying regulations to ensure 
that practices are carried out as safely as is acceptable to 
society. In the case of radiation the risk of harm is based 
upon the relationship of exposure with effect, that is damage 
to health. Having established the exposure-effect relationship 
it is possible to control the radiation source to ensure that 
the dose received represents an acceptable risk of harm. An 
upper control limit is set for the dose, well below the no 
detectable adverse effect level. Such an exercise relies upon 
the modelling of the exposure-effect relationship. There is 
disagreement within the medical and scientific community over 
the interpretation of data and the shape of the exposure- 




























































































constitutes a 'safe' level of exposure. If it is assumed that 
there is no threshold below which a dose cannot cause harm, it 
follows that an undetectable amount of harm will inevitably 
occur. On the basis of the no-threashold assumption there is 
thus a further requirement to optimize radiation protection, 
that is "balancing protection costs and [the detriment of] 
residual levels of exposure" (Webb and Lochard, 1984, p5-6) .
The rest of this paper follows 
setting.





























































































What if it doesn't work?
In great secrecy the first atomic reactor was activated in 
December 1942. The research team at Chicago was led by Enrico 
Fermi. Their atomic pile of graphite, uranium and uranium 
oxide had three independent sets of control rods. In addition 
Fermi instituted a number of other safety features. There was 
an emergency safety rod which was to be released in case the 
automatic rods failed. On top of the pile, researchers stood 
ready with buckets of cadmium salt solution to flood the pile 
should something unexpected happen (Stadie, 1985). Thus the 
very first nuclear reactor was protected through the practice 
of defence-in-depth - in this case, by the installation of 
backup shut-down systems to nullify the consequences of 
malfunction.
A safety system can be imagined as a series of barriers. The 
reactor's fission products are sealed from the environment by 
several independent barriers, avoiding undue reliance upon any 
single safety provision. Some barriers are physical: the 
fuel's cladding, the reactor core, the pressure vessel and the 
containment building. Others may be engineered systems, such 
as backups to be brought into action if necessary or the 
extent to which the reactor is designed to achieve inherently 
safe behaviour. The barriers can also be thought of as 
including social arrangements, such as quality assurance and 
quality control in plant design, construction and operation, 
and siting criteria. Emergency planning or preparedness is not 
always considered to be part of defence-in-depth since plant 
owners and operators are expected to reduce the risks to 
acceptable levels without the help of such procedures.
In asking the question "what if it doesn't work?" a regulator 
can probe the extent of defence-in-depth. A designer can 
.••include features to avoid predetermined consequences of
failures. Provided there is sufficient assurance against the 
worst case accident, a licence can be granted to operate the 
plant. Clearly, such an approach relies upon the capacity of 
designers and safety engineers to foresee the possibility and 
consequences of failures.
"Engineering judgement" is the term used to describe the 
process whereby engineers decide upon a design that lias a 
negligible probability of failure. A structure might be 
designed to withstand specific but unusual events, for 
instance, a freak wave or storm experienced only once in a 
century. Safety margins are calculated for load-bearing 
structures or stressed materials. Case histories are analysed 
and average failure rates or rules of thumb used to establish 
a standard of good practice.
Such an approach is called deterministic and underlies, as 
will be shown, the regulation of safety as it is practically 




























































































the risk of failure is not fully quantified. There is a spread 
of, say, stresses or strengths in a structure and thus a range 
of chances of failure. Designing on the basis of an average or 
rule of thumb cannot take into account the distribution of 
probabilities, including those for events with a low chance of 
occurrence. Secondly, there is a hidden judgement concerning 
those risks that are acceptable or negligible. Thirdly, an 
engineering philososphy relying upon the extension of past 
practice and case histories inadequately handles novel 
situations, for instance those arising from advances in 
technology. Finally, the issue of how safe plant should be is 
open-ended. The question "what if it doesn't work ?" can be 
repeated endlessly, a potential for bidding up of safety 
levels by regulators (see The Royal Society, 1983, p26-27; 
Rimington, 1987, plO).
Probabilistic safety analysis systematically examines expected 
performance and failure to obtain estimates of the risk and 
consequence of a hazard. This perspective allows for the 
quantification of the spread of possible events according to 
the probability of their occurrence. Whether the risk is 
acceptable or not can be assessed independently of the 
designer’s judgement: it opens up the design to scrutiny. 
Potentially probabilities can be assigned to events that have 
not yet happened, and, moreover, such estimates may be 
questioned or altered, perhaps being described as " 
conservative assumptions". Risks between different plants or 
between industrial and social activities can be compared on a 
similar basis and a decision on what constitutes an acceptable 
risk might be made as a result. This defines the ultimate 
level of safety with which a regulator may be satisfied.
To be sure, probabilistic safety assessment remains only a 
decision-aiding tool. Its proponents advocate its usage as a 
means whereby hazards are subjected to systematic evaluation: 
possible sources of danger, fault conditions or a sequence of 
failures leading to accidents should not be overlooked if 
every part of the engineered system is examined. In its 
quantified form of probabilistic risk assessment, an event 
tree (or fault tree) can be constructed. Each component can be 
assigned a probability of failure together with an anticipated 
consequence. In principle human failure can be treated in the 
same way.
Such estimates of probability are only as good as the 
reliability data upon which they are based. Professor Allan 
Mazur cited his own experience as a reliability engineer in 
the aerospace industry, calling probabilistic risk assessment 
"an exercise in science fiction" in view of the lack of 
failure data (Mazur, 1980). Indeed at the same international 
workshop it was agreed that risk assessment research was an 
immature field "characterised ... by fragmentation, lack of 
coherent knowledge and consensus of researchers, and little 
evidence of the establishment of a stable and qualified 
community”. Johnston also particularly pointed to probability 




























































































upon exposure-effect correlations, as being able to "provide 
only the most tentative of guidance" (Johnston, 1980). A later 
assessment could merely claim that probabilistic risk 
assessment "has made significant strides towards maturity" 
over the last two decades (Speis and Jahns, 1985, pl85).
Furthermore, some have argued that such risk assessments "in 
part serve to legitimate decisions and actions ... rather than 
being outcomes or expressions of rational search processes. 
Tragic choices by organizations do not have to be optimal or 
even solve the problem demanding attention, but they do have 
to be legitimated to those who will bear the cost of those 
choices" (Clarke, 1988, p30) . Despite the protestations of 
(regulatory) scientists that risk assessment is a scientific 
issue while risk acceptability is a political one, the 
technique itself is both the product of social forces - the 
outcome of disputes within the scientific community and 
organisations or of political factors - and value loaded, by 
incorporating assumptions that individuals can choose between 
risks they face or that trade-offs are possible. It is an 
example of a "trans-scientific" issue (see Weinberg, 1974).
Although probabilistic methods for assessing safety are being 
employed more frequently, see Appendix A, they remain 
complements to regulatory and licensing procedures. The latter 
are still based upon deterministic approaches. That is, based 
upon "a set of requirements for normal operation and of a pre­
determined set of accidents, the so-called 'design basis 
accidents', considered to lie within a sufficiently low range 
of probability of occurrence and to be the extreme cases of 
certain types of accident" (CEC, 1987, p2). Yet there is a 
shift underway to probabilistic methods which could have major 
implications for how hazards are judged to be acceptable. The 
shift is being championed by scientist regulators associated 
with the International Commission on Radiological Protection.
Acceptable risk from radiation
Despite the common belief that standards for protection from 
the harmful effects of radiation are derived through the 
application of scientific method, their origin lies in a 
social judgement. This can be seen from the way the 
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) - a 
non-governmental organisation that effectively sets the 
regulations world-wide - formulates its recommendations. An 
analysis and history of the ICRP's part in formulating the 
concept of acceptable risk is to be found in Fagnani and 
Nicolon (1979). This organisation's pivotal role in setting a 
set of world-wide safety standards cannot be seen in isolation 
from the dominant position that the USA has held in the 
industrialised and scientific worlds since the 1940s (Fagnani 
and Nicolon, 1979, p481). It is however the substance of its 
recommendations that concern us here rather than how or why 




























































































The current limit for occupational exposure is 50 mSv per 
year. [A sievert (Sv) is a measure of exposure.] It is 
equivalent to that adopted by the ICP.P thirty years ago: 5 rem 
per year for a whole body dose (ICRP, 1959). This "maximum 
permissible dose" was defined as "that dose ... which in the 
light of present knowledge, carries a negligible probability 
of severe somatic or genetic injuries; furthermore, it is such 
a dose that any effects that ensue more frequently are limited 
to those of a minor nature that would not be considered 
unacceptable by the exposed individual and by competent 
medical authorities".
The argument then, as now, crucially revolves around the idea 
of acceptable risk (see Ilari, 1986, p4). In 1959, provided 
that the regulations were adhered to, risk of severe harm from 
exposure was "negligible" and, of harm generally, "not 
unacceptable". It is however a social judgement going under 
the guise of a scientific statement. The basis upon which the 
judgement is made is not stated explicitly; for "negligible" 
begs the questions "compared to what?" and "to whom?". By 
1977, when the ICRP revised their recommendations 
significantly by dropping the maximum permissible limit and 
adopting a three-fold system of dose protection (see next 
section), there was greater clarity: "In recommending 
appropriate limits for any occupational or other exposure to 
radiation, it is obviously desirable to estimate the types and 
frequencies of harmful effects that may result from any given 
radiation exposure. Moreover, in assessing the safety of an 
occupation involving such exposure and comparing it with the 
safety of other occupations, it is important to compare the 
total harm that may be caused by the radiation, both in those 
exposed and in their descendants, with the total harm involved 
in other occupations, whether by fatal or minor injury, 
occupational disease, or the effects of mutagens in the 
environment" (ICRP, 1977b, pi).
In the ICRP's view the risk to all radiation workers at the 
exposure level of 50 mSv/year is " equivalent to an occupation 
with a fatal accident rate of 340 x 10~f,/year, comparable with 
that in construction work or coal-mining in many countries" 
(ICRP, 1977b, p22). The risks to the public were also 
considered comparable in kind to ttie risks of immediate deaths 
in other industries (Webb and Dunster, 1985, p307).
The relationship between an individual's exposure and risk of 
harm is shown in Figures 1 and 2. At the higher levels of 
exposure - in the range 3-5 Sv/year - early death is very 
likely. At the equivalent of about 4 Sv/year half an exposed 
population will die: this is the LD50 [meaning the lethal dose 
for 50%] . Much lower levels of exposure carry a lower risk of 
severe harm, for example the induction of a fatal cancer. 
Nevertheless in any one year, exposure at the upper control 
limit of 50 mSv implies that the individual worker faces a 
lifetime risk of between 1 in 1 000 and 1 in 10 000 (about 
5 x lO*3). Even at the lower level of exposure of 15 mSv, which 




























































































point at which a more rigorous justification for further 
exposure is required, the risk exceeds 1 in 10 000. In 
practice most radiation workers face a risk of between 1 in 
10 000 and 1 in 40 000 (HSE, 1988, p23). The upper control 
limit for the public of 5 mSv lies in the same range (about 
5 x lO-'1 ) . Whilst the limit for all doses for the public over a 
lifetime, recommended as being 1 mSv/year, is a risk of 1 in 
100 000.
By way of comparison, the fallout from almost 500 atomic bombs 
exploded above ground will by the end of this century deliver 
a dose of about 1 mSv to everyone on the planet (Caufield, 
1989, p30). The contamination resulting from the world's worst 
nuclear accident at Chernobyl-4 necessitated the evacuation of 
135 000 people from a 30 km zone as exposure levels climbed 
over 100 mSv per person. In terms of its fallout, the total 
dose for an average adult over 50 years is between 6.5 and 
30.5 mSv in the European part of the USSR - dependant upon 
assumptions made about the intake of radionucleides in food - 
and about 1, 0.4 and 0.27 mSv in Hungary, northern Italy and 
Wales respectively (see CEC, 1986a, plO; EC ESC 1987a, pp8 and 
11; Sztanyik, 1985, pl64).
There has been much debate both within the scientific and 
medical community, and in the public arena, as to whether the 
ICRP's calculations of the risk values attached to harm are 
valid (see for example Bertell, 1985, pp49-63). In a candid 
aside a member of the ICRP, John Dunster, has admitted: "I
think that most of the information we describe as data in the 
radiation protection and nuclear safety sense is not data at 
all. It is invention. We pretend we know the dose-effect 
relationship. It is a convincing story [but] it rests on 
fairly shaky bases" (NEA/OECD, 1985, p315). A review is in 
hand by the ICRP, taking into account re-evaluations of data 
relating to the survivors of the atomic explosions over 
.Hiroshima and Nagasaki amongst other things, which is expected 
to result in a revised set of recommendations in 1990.
Much less attention has however been devoted to the 
relationship of the dose limits themselves and the concept of 
acceptable risk. These limits are not simply the upper control 
limits, set at a level prejudged to carry an acceptable risk, 
but are intended to be set for each different practice through 
a process of optimization. This further component in setting 
acceptable risk is analysed next.
Cost-benefit analysis and the morality of optimization
At an international seminar the director of the UK’s National 
Radiological Protection Board, John Dunster, made the remark 
that optimization of safety was necessary because " if you 
have a residual risk you have a moral duty to remove risks 
which are easily removable" (NEA/OECD, 1985, p74). He was 
expressing the philosophy whicli underpins the system of 
radiological protection advocated by the ICRP and arguing for 




























































































section we examine the ICRP system.
The main features of the ICRP's system of dose limitation are:
"(a) no practice shall be adopted unless its 
introduction produces a net benefit;
(b) all exposures shall be kept as low as reasonably 
achievable (ALARM, economic and social factors being 
taken into account;
(c) the dose equivalent to the individual shall not 
exceed the limits recommended for the appropriate 
circumstances by the Commission" (ICRP,1977a).
Operating these three principles - justification of practice, 
optimization of protection and individual dose limitation - 
in conjunction with one another, throws up decision-making 
problems of considerable complexity. This stems from the fact 
that the harm threatened by the hazard cannot be determined 
for sure.
For instance, the extent of protection provided to a radiation 
worker is not to be determined by reference to the risks the 
worker is prepared to bear. Even if the individual explicitly 
accepted the risk itself the ALARA principle requires that the 
costs of additional protection be weighed against the benefit 
of a reduced risk of harm. Two arguments can be advanced to 
justify this position. Firstly, there are possible mutagenic 
and teratogenic effects which because they involve the health 
of future generations are the responsibility of society as a 
whole, not merely the individual. Secondly, there is some 
definite expectation of harm to the whole exposed population 
from all doses. "If this harm can be reduced at reasonable 
efforts, why should this not be done? If we fail to do the 
.reasonable thing, we can hardly call the situation acceptable" 
(Beninson and Lindell, 1985, p24).
Echoes of a deterministic approach are found in the third 
element of the system, that of individual dose limits. The 
risk of harm is assumed to be proportional to the dose, 
exposure to which can be estimated with certainty. Exposure 
can be planned through dose control, that is through measures 
which regulate the source of radiation and the distribution of 
the collective dose amongst those exposed. In day to day 
operations the ICRP individual dose limits act as upper bounds 
to planned exposure. The individual's risk of harm can be 
calculated from the dose actually committed (received). But 
clearly each exposure carries a further increment of risk and, 
at any one time, future exposures are uncertain. Under the 
previous system of maximum permissible doses this uncertainty 
was not acknowledged. ICRP now recognise that the distribution 
of doses amongst those exposed and over time is a factor in 
radiation protection. The way that this uncertainty factor can 
be incorporated into the system of radiation protection is 




























































































regulatory community (see Gonzalez and Webb, 1988). It is 
likely that annual individual dose limits for workers will be 
recommended: if these were established at 0.5 or 1 mSv/year 
there would be "consistency" with the existing limit for 
members of the public.
Yet the nature of the exposure-effect relationship is 
probabilistic, except at lethal levels of exposure of greater 
than the equivalent of 5 Sv. Even if individuals face a 
negligible risk from their own exposure, society could face a 
situation where a large number of small doses amount to a high 
overall expectation of harm. Attempting to use the ICRP's own 
principles of justification and optimization is in practice 
fraught with difficulty.
Nevertheless the ICRP recommend the use of cost-benefit 
analysis to evaluate principles of both justification and 
optimization. "Ideally the acceptability of a proposed 
operation or practice involving exposure to radiation should 
be determined by cost-benefit analysis, the purpose of which 
is to ensure that the total detriment should be appropriately 
small in relation to the benefit resulting from the 
introduction of the proposed activity” (ICRP, 1977a, para.69). 
Although work is under way to develop multi-attribute utility 
analysis to aid decision-making in the optimization process - 
to include criteria which are difficult to quantify in 
monetary terms - the system of optimization relies upon cost- 
benefit analysis wherever quantification is attempted in 
practice.
The costs of radiation protection in a workplace may include 
shielding and ventilation, use of remote handling equipment or 
robots, bringing more people in to do the task (to reduce the 
size of doses to each individual) or mock-up training (to 
speed the actual operation). Benefits relate to the value put 
on life. For any unit of exposure - measured in sieverts - 
there is a risk of fatality. Thus dividing the value of life 
by the risk can give a value for a unit of exposure in 
S/person Sv.
Where the dose committed is certain, practice in the radiation 
protection field relates harm to the size of the dose (which 
may be a collective or individual dose). So-called "objective 
health detriment" is measured therefore in terms of the dose 
(more properly the effective dose equivalent) in sieverts. 
Multiplying the dose(s) by the reference $ value for a sievert 
gives the benefit of avoiding that dose in monetary terms. It 
is possible to so value the collective dose to give greater 
weight to high individual doses - implying risk aversion to 
larger doses - thus taking into account the distribution of 





advise that optimization is achieved when "the 
in the cost of protection per unit dose equivalent 




























































































(ICRP, 1977a, para.74). The balance is attained when the sum 
of the cost of protection and the cost of dose detriment is 
minimized or their marginal costs equated. This is illustrated 
in Figure 3.
Figure 3 shows the cost of the collective dose - and therefore 
the cost put on risk of harm - rising linearly: the cost of 
harm is proportionate to the degree of risk. As risk becomes 
more remote, the value put on avoiding harm is assumed to be 
smaller. Alternative models can be postulated, for instance an 
exponentially rising curve, where the cost put on harm rises 
at a greater rate than the degree of risk. It can also be 
argued that the value of avoiding harm should be invariant 
with regard to the degree of risk, in other words, that D is 
constant (it would be drawn parallel to the x axis in Figure 
3). It cannot be deduced from the fact that since remote risks 
are often ignored - perhaps because individuals are only dimly 
aware of them - that they should be valued
(dis)proportionately lower. Even remote risks of harm add to 
the total risk already faced by everybody in society. The 
imposition of many additional small risks could sum to a 
significantly large total risk from all sources. "If a low 
price of risk were accepted for these, safety measures would 
be shifted considerably away from the optimum" (Babaev and 
others, 1986, p475).
Also shown in Figure 3 is the typical range of prot 
costs which might be incurred through the applicati 
best practicable technology. The cost of protection 
implies that technology is available to achieve - a 
costs - certain levels of protection. 'Best practic 
technology' is usually taken to refer to protection 
that is commercially available, in a tested design 
cost that is not exorbitant: it reflects above aver 
industrial practice (Crouch and Wilson, 1982, pp92- 
.Rowe, 1988, p78). Were protection to be organised a 
"best practicable technology, a higher level of safe 
provided than would be the case if the ICRP system 
followed. As a method of controlling risk, however, 
no attempt to evaluate the harm threatened.
ection 
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Defenders of the ICRP system frequently argue that it does not 
attempt to put a value on human life. One suggests that "no 
economic valuation is directly attributed to human life, and, 
in fact, there is no limit on the cost of protection needed to 
keep the exposure of individuals within the recommended dose 
limits. On the other hand, if further reduction of the 
collective radiological impact of a source must be pursued ... 
there is a need to ensure the optimum use of resources 
available to society by aiming at a level of protection which 
is the highest achievable without conflicting with other 
legitimate needs of the society for these resources" (Ilari, 
1986, p8).
The same point is made by the UK National Radiological 




























































































l'Evaluation de la Protection dans le domaine Nucléaire 
(CEPN): "if the efforts of the authorities are not to result 
in all of the available resources eventually being pressed to 
spend on safety related measures then either those who are 
being pressed to spend the money must resist - which is out of 
touch with the present day ethos - or the system which applies 
the pressure should have some built in checks and balances of 
its own" (Webb and Lochard, 1984, pl3). It is a view shared 
also by the Vatican's Pontifical Academy of Sciences who call 
it "a device for conserving live;;" (Pontifical Academy of 
Sciences, 1985) .
A distinction is sometimes drawn between "statistical deaths" 
where victims are not identifiable and, presumably, the 
reality (for someone) of dying before your time (Rowe, 1988, 
p365) . Others talk of the value of statistical lifesaving from 
risk reduction (Lakey and Lewins, 1987, p35) or of the price 
of risk (Babaev and others, 1986). These arguments are
examples of casuistry since. will be shown, in practice the
$ reference value for a sievert can only be based on making an 




























































































INTERNATIONAL REGULATION IN EUROPE 
Setting basic safety standards
Nuclear matters have commanded a large measure of attention 
from international organisations. This section examines the 
role of the European Community (EC) in regulating nuclear 
power and also briefly refers to the work of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Both are involved in setting 
basic safety standards but do so in rather different ways.
One can define a number of levels of regulation in respect of 
industrial safety. Table 1 provides such a format. At the 
international level only basic safety standards are likely to 
be set. They are basic because they are usually the result of 
consensus around a fairly low common denominator reflecting 
currently adopted "good practice". In addition countries have 
the right to choose to set higher standards . However they are 
also basic in the sense that they set out those principles and 
practices that are generally considered to be fundamentally 
necessary towards ensuring safety.
Both for reasons of national sovereignty and responsibility to 
their own citizens most states are unwilling to allow 
international organisations rights of licensing or inspection. 
Nevertheless it is evident that the role of international 
organisations in setting basic safety standards is a powerful 
legitimating factor in respect of national levels of safety. 
This is particularly true in areas where technical competence 
is thought to provide an objective basis for safety standards. 
It is surely reassuring to know that experts worldwide are 
agreed on the efficacy of particular standards or measures.
For the Community's nearly one million workers who are 
regularly checked for exposure to radiation there is in theory 
one system of protection, offering equality in treatment in 
safety matters according to accepted Science (CEC, 1986c, pi). 
The arguments which developed within the EC as a result of 
differing national standards being applied to contaminated 
agricultural produce due to fallout from Chernobyl only serves 
to underline how the absence of internationally agreed 
measures called into question the competence of Science 
itself.
The European Community: responsibilities
Within the European Community, regulation of radiation 
exposure has been established tinder the terms of the Euratom 
Treaty. Article 2b of the 1957 Treaty specifies that the 
Commission shall "establish uniform safety standards to 
protect the health of workers and of the general public and 
ensure that they are applied" (CEC, 1978). The motive, it 
seems, for creating uniform standards was that differing 
national health and safety standards could affect the mobility 
of labour and production costs, thus undermining the 
effectiveness of the nuclear common market (Droutman, 1973, 




























































































of the Commission in the field of health and safety and the 
rights and obligations of Member States.
These provisions stipulate that the Commission shall draw up 
basic standards after obtaining the opinion of a group of 
experts appointed by the Scientific and Technical Committee 
and of the Economic and Social Committee. In the Treaty the 
basic safety standards are defined as being the maximum 
permissible doses compatible with adequate safety, the maximum 
permissible levels of exposure and contamination and the 
fundamental principles governing the health surveillance of 
workers. Member States are obliged to comply with the basic 
safety standards and the Commission is required to make 
appropriate recommendations for the purpose of harmonizing the 
provisions. Member States have to demonstrate their compliance 
with the standards by providing the Commission with the 
results of monitoring, which the latter has the right to 
verify through access to monitoring facilities. The Commission 
may also issue directives in cases of urgency requiring action 
by a Member State to take all necessary measures to prevent 
infringement of the standards.
Virtually all the Commission's activity in the field of 
nuclear safety can be traced back to its powers to set basic 
safety standards. The powers however are lacking in the area 
of enforcement. Except in situations where dangerous 
experiments or the disposal of radioactive waste could affect 
another Member State, Member States are answerable only to 
their own citizens as regards their peaceful use of the atom. 
Nor does the Commission play any role in licensing or 
inspection of nuclear power plants.
The Commission does have further powers in the field of 
scientific research and environmental protection. Under 
Article 2a of the Euratom Treaty the Commission shall "promote 
research and ensure the dissemination of technical 
information". This provision together with Annex I-VI of the 
Treaty which foresees the "study of the harmful effects of 
radiation on living organisms" form the basis for the 
Commission's radiation protection programme.
It is not yet clear how the provisions of the Single European 
Act will affect the EC's activity in the field of nuclear 
safety. Article 25 of the Single European Act specifies that 
"action by the Community relating to the environment shall 
have the ... objectives to preserve, protect and improve the 
quality of the environment [and] to contribute towards 
protecting human health" (Bulletin, Supplement 2/86). 
Directives laying down minimum requirements for the health and 
safety of workers are permitted by Article 21 "having regard 
to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in each of the 
Member States" and provided that these do not "hold back the 





























































































The provisions of the Euratom Treaty also structure the 
Commission's own bureaucracy. Hence the work defined by 
Article 2b and Chapter III is undertaken by Directorate- 
General XI for Environment, Consumer Protection and Nuclear 
Safety. Until 1988 nuclear safety was part of D-G V 
(Employment, Social Affairs and Education) responsibility, 
with only a small section of staff in D-G XI involved in co­
ordination. Work under Article 2a is the responsibility of 
D-G XII for Science, Research and Development. Quite separate 
again is the work of D-G XVII for Energy dealing with energy 
policy. Within D-G XI its competence in the area of nuclear 
environmental impact continues to be linked closely with the 
Euratom Treaty, despite the wider role the Commission now has 
in environmental policy and planning.
Differing national perceptions of the Commission's role, the 
growth of the nuclear industry since the 1950s into a 
significant industrial sector of both public and private 
enterprises and diverging energy policies of Member States 
have all conspired to force the Commission to restrict its 
activities even under the terms of the Euratom Treaty. It sees 
its role as limited to setting safety objectives and providing 
uniform radiation protection standards (EC EP, 1988c, p54).
The European Community: practice
Without general powers in respect of nuclear safety the 
Commission's activities are specifically geared to research 
and development, harmonization of standards and radiological 
protection. These are examined in turn.
The Commission's Joint Research Centre is involved in several 
aspects of risk management, both nuclear and non-nuclear (see 
Amendola, 1988). It is undertaking, for instance, an 
assessment of methods and procedures for probabilistic safety 
analysis to establish a common awareness of the advantages, 
cost-effectiveness and state of the art of such models and 
procedures. This included the MARIA project started in 1932 
(Methods for Assessing the Radiological Impact of Accidents - 
see CEC, 1985). A programme is underway to establish a 
commonly agreed state of the art procedure throughout Europe. 
The Major Accident Reporting System (MARS) set up for chemical 
incidents under the Seveso Directive and the European 
Reliability Data System which collects and harmonizes 
component reliability, incident and plant availability data 
from nuclear power plants in Europe aim to improve data 
acquisition. A European Safety and Reliability Association lias 
been sponsored and the EC is involved in steps to create a 
Master's Degree in Reliability (interview with Ilrian Tolley, 
D-G XII.E.l on 13 October 1988). Such moves aid the discipline 
of risk management's progress towards maturity and builds up 
the data bases, so that uncertainty in carrying out 
probabilistic risk assessment is reduced. Of itself, however, 
such activity does not address the problem that in the 
capitalist world much performance data is owned by private 




























































































disclose data by laws permitting the confidentiality of 
commercially sensitive information.
Aiding the harmonization of reactor safety requirements was 
added to the Commission's responsibilities by a Council 
Resolution of 22 July 1975 (Official Journal C185/1,
14.08.75). This authorised "the progressive harmonization of 
safety requirements and criteria in order to provide an 
equivalent and satisfactory degree of protection of the 
population and of the environment against the risks of 
radiation resulting from nuclear activities and at the same 
time to assist the development of trade". It also requested 
tlie Member States to seek common positions and co-ordination 
in respect of safety harmonization and research being dealt 
with by international organisations.
In the Commission's view the benefit of such work comes from 
the analysis and diverse scrutiny of differing approaches 
which "tends to consolidate the confidence in each others' 
approach and to ensure that potentially severe sequences of 
accidents have not been overlooked". It will "promote 
convergence to an equivalent assurance of safety throughout 
the Community" (CEC,1987, p3-4). Two types of nuclear power 
plant were chosen, the Light Water Reactor (LWR) which is the 
most common technology in Europe and the Liquid Metal Fast 
Breeder Reactor (LMFBR), the next generation of reactors using 
plutonium. Work on the harmonization of LWR safety proceeded 
slowly because of complexities introduced by reviews of 
nuclear safety policies following the accident at Three Mile 
Island (TMI-2) in 1979 and because most national regulatory 
organisations were "reluctant to envisage a central role of 
the Community on regulatory matters" and unable to achieve 
consensus amongst themselves (CEC, 1987, pl2) . nevertheless 
the Commission issued its basic safety principles for LWR 
nuclear power plants which are a reference for judgements made 
in the safety evaluation process at national and lower levels 
(see CEC, 1981). Appendix B sets out these basic safety 
principles. This activity whilst a significant move towards 
harmonization of safety standards, fell far short of 
constituting a Community Nuclear Safety Code of uniform 
standards binding upon Member States, a proposal advocated by 
the EC Economic and Social Committee (EC ESC, 1977).
Basic safety standards for radiological protection have been 
regularly updated by the EC following those first issued in 
1959. At first a principle of minimization of exposure was 
adopted, but this was revised to the ALARA principle in 1976 
(see Bischof, 1984, p59). The Council of Ministers' current 
Directive was adopted on 15 July 1980 and amended slightly on 
3 September 1984 (see Official Journal Nos. L246/1 
[80/836/Euratom] and L265 [84/467/Euratom]). It reads as 
follows:
"The limitation of individual and collective doses 
resulting from controllable exposures shall be based on 




























































































(a) the various types of activity resulting in an 
exposure to ionizing radiation shall have been 
justified in advance by the advantages they produce;
(b) all exposures shall be kept as low as reasonably 
achievable;
(c) without prejudice to Article 11 [planned special 
exposures], the sum of the doses and committed doses 
received shall not exceed the dose limits laid down 
in this Title for exposed workers, apprentices and 
students and members of the public."
In a Communication the Commission has set out a commentary on 
these principles. "The justification (ie. the first principle) 
of any type of activity is the duty of competent authority in 
Member States. Compliance with this principle is adequately 
demonstrated in respect of a type of activity by the existence 
or the laying down of regulations specifically concerning the 
type of activity. The second principle (optimization) requires 
that exposures shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable 
below the prescribed limits, economic and social factors being 
taken into account. Generally, in routine activities, 
optimization need not involve complex calculations.
"It is implicit in this requirement that scientific 
considerations should be supplemented by economic and social 
factors. The techniques for judging the need for further 
reductions in exposure in the light of what is reasonable are 
very diverse. They include for instance formal aids to 
decision-making, such as cost-benefit: analysis, etc. but they 
are more usually based on simple common-sense practice. If an 
improvement is easy to make and commits only few resources, it 
is sensible, and therefore reasonable, to make the 
.improvement. If the improvement requires the major commitment 
of resources and produces only small reductions of exposure, 
it is likely to be unreasonable and therefore inappropriate. 
Because the procedures involve a combination of scientific, 
economic and social judgements, it is helpful to link them 
with decision-making procedures used in the Member States" 
(Official Journal Mo. C347 1985).
In effect this means that the Commission assumes that the 
presence of regulatory procedures in the Member States is a 
sufficient condition for demonstrating the existence of net 
benefit from activities resulting in radiation exposure. One 
could argue that the Commission consider that positive net 
benefits do indeed exist from the operation of and investment: 
in nuclear power plants. The Commission’s Illustrative Nuclear 
Programme indicates nuclear energy production targets based on 
considerations of energy strategy and diversification of 
sources (CEC, 1985b). It also advocates the use of cost- 
benefit analysis and , furthermore, the use of probabilistic 
safety assessment as tools for rational decision-making (CEC, 




























































































Commission's monitoring of Member States’ compliance with its 
basic safety standards.
This is despite the opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee that the advantages required for the principle of 
justification "must take full account of the social as well 
economic considerations" (Official Journal No. C128 1979). An 
explanation for the Commission's reticence may lie in the fact 
that the Council is polarised as regards the advantages of 
nuclear power and has adopted a compromise position of 
agreeing with the Commission's analysis of the role of nuclear 
energy in the Community's overall energy strategy on the 
understanding that it is for each Member State to make its own 
decisions. On the issue of cost-benefit analysis the social 
partners on the Economic and Social Committee are divided. The 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has reservations 
with respect to cost-benefit analysis' "strictly economic 
approach" (CEC, 1984, p487). In general, the ETUC advocates 
the establishment of environmental standards according to the 
state of the art, constantly adapted to the best available 
technologies (ETUC, 1988).
On the related issue of occupational health protection from 
chemical, physical and biological agents, including those with 
carcinogenic effects, the Committee rejects the Commission and 
Council's reliance (in Directive 80/1107/EEC and its 
amendments) upon reducing exposure "to as low a level as is 
reasonably practicable" in favour of "an exposure level which 
takes account of the state of the art [in protection 
technology], as far as possible" (EC ESC, 1987, pl8). This 
protection philosophy is combined with the principle that 
"priority must be given to protecting the health of workers 
[...] though economic interests should suffer as little as 
possible as a result" (EC ESC, 1979, p6 and EC ESC, 1987, p3) . 
Below the maximum permissible values for carcinogen 
concentrations in the working atmosphere "employers should be 
required, using available technology and ... work 
organisation, to reduce exposure as far as possible" (EC ESC, 
1988a, p7).
This approach is also adopted by the European Parliament's 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer 
Protection. In submitting its amendments to the Commission's 
draft Framework Directive on measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of workers, issued under 
the terms of the Single European Act, the Committee put 
forward a quite different point of view to that of the 
Commission. It considered that "safety and hygiene at work and 
the mental and physical health of workers constitute a 
fundamental right which cannot be subordinated to economic 
considerations" (EC EP, 1988a, pl3). While the Directive 
repeats the formula of "the maximum degree of protection which 
is reasonably practicable to achieve", the Parliament's 
Committee proposes that "technologically feasible safety 




























































































These criteria, being technology-led - workers are in essence 
entitled to the best available technology to reduce risk - 
avoid optimizing protection on the basis o£ net costs (or 
benefits) altogether. In fact the European Parliament's 
Committee considers that since health is a supreme and 
inalienable good "there is no place for cost-benefit analysis" 
(EC EP, 1987a, pl6).
The consensus rather than regulatory approach to safety 
policy-making can also be seen in the Commission's 
relationship to the scientific community. In addition to the 
requirement of the Euratom Treaty to seek the opinion of a 
group of scientific experts, including public health experts - 
the Article 31 Group - on the basic safety standards, the 
Commission has organised wider discussion within the 
scientific and radiological protection technical community. 
Three European scientific seminars have been held. The first, 
on 3-5 October 1979 in Luxembourg, facilitated discussion of 
the standards in advance of their acceptance. That of 8-9 
November 1983, also in Luxembourg, provided the forum for 
discussion of the standards' practical implementation and 
meaning since some concepts were not widely understood. The 
Madrid seminar of 12-14 September 1988 allowed experience of 
the usage of optimization to be exchanged and highlighted the 
need to go beyond the use of cost-benefit analysis to 
developing multi-attribute utility analysis and outranking 
analysis as complements. (Interview with Jaak Sinnaeve, D-G 
XII.F.l on 13 October 1988.) These are active measures 
designed to explain, enlighten and engage, unlike consultation 
processes which rely only upon the submission of written 
views. A handbook on optimization is being produced and there 
is an intention to publish a communication on the assurance of 
nuclear safety on the basis of consensus within the Community 
(interview with Jean-Paul Pele, D-G XII. D.l on 1.2 October 
1988).
The European Community: the future
Although it is the aim of the Single European Act to create a 
large barrier-free internal market based on greater economic 
and social cohesion and geared towards rectifying imbalances 
between countries, regions, production sectors and economic 
groups, it is not clear that it will encourage improvements in 
the sphere of nuclear safety. The pressures of competition to 
reduce costs could erode margins of safety. A west European 
electricity grid (the UCPTE network) already stretches from 
Scandinavia to the Mediterranean, carrying 1300 TWh per year 
(EC ESC, 1988b, p8). Encouragement of trade in electricity 
using the grid (currently about 10% of the EC's total power- 
production) , the harmonization of tariffs to consumers and the 
competition from non-EC coal may result in downward pressure 
on electricity prices in the middle 1990s. Whether this would 
adversely affect safety standards in nuclear power plants 
depends also on the extent to which intra-EC coal trade is 




























































































protection controls for fossil-fuel power stations. Continued 
protection of Member States' own coal industries and high 
environmental protection standards for emissions would cushion 
the nuclear industry's exposure to competition from lower cost 
power producers.
Within the Commission's bureaucracy, nuclear safety and 
environmental impact issues are treated separately from its 
general policy stance towards public and occupational safety, 
risk management and environmental protection; this despite the 
integration of the nuclear safety section within D-G XI. The 
development of a comprehensive and common policy in these 
areas could be based on the existing similarities in approach. 
In the area of worker protection from chemical and other 
harmful substances there is a distinct equivalence between "as 
low as is reasonably practicable" and nuclear’s ALAP.A. The 
emphasis placed by the Commission on "state of the art" 
methods and "best available technology" in determining 
environmental protection standards has a parallel in the 
recognition that with "appropriate provisions" doses from 
discharges can be kept very low, though ALARA remains the aim 
(see CEC, 1981, p5 and CEC, 1986b, p31). However a consensus 
approach to to regulation tends to involve the use of the 
principle of the lowest common denominator. Moreover the EC's 
history in regulating hazardous chemicals is that "its 
programmes more effectively remove or prevent trade barriers 
than guarantee the citizens of member countries equal 
protection from harm” (Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen, 1985, 
p289). Unless there are specific pressures to improve nuclear 
safety standards there is a distinct possibility that a common 
safety and environmental protection policy would merely 
maintain the current situation, or even allow it to be 
undermined by the forces of competition. Such pressures might 
have been expected after the Chernobyl disaster.
Following the tragedy at the Chernobyl-4 RBMK in 1986 the 
extent of the Community’s role and the adequacy of existing 
powers and activities were reviewed. (More detailed appraisals 
can be found in Leroy, 1986, Johnson and Corcelle, 1987 and 
Vercellino, 1986.) Calls from the European Parliament for the 
establishment of a Community Inspection Force for monitoring 
the application of common Community safety standards for 
nuclear installations according to the roost up-to-date 
technical norms were referred to a "group of national 
representatives" (see EC EP, 1987b, p6 and CEC, 1986c, pl2). 
This group concluded that such a force would achieve little 
more than duplication of national inspectorates and, without 
being very large in number, would not materially assist in the 
prevention of accidents. However the Commission would review 
the setting of emission standards, a controversy highlighted 
in the dispute between France and its neighbours over the 
frontier-based Cattenom nuclear power plants.
To examine problems of safety standards and emergency 
reference levels a committee of "high-level independent" 




























































































research in a variety of fields, the issue of guidelines by 
the Commission on accident counter-measures and planning and 
studies of public opinion (CEC, 1988b). In these actions the 
Commission was acting in a similar way to another 
international agency, the Organisation for Economic Co­
operation and Development (OECD), which commissioned a report 
by a "group of experts" (NEA/OECD, 1987). This method allows 
governments to pass responsibility for drawing up the agenda 
for action to people already highly involved in the nuclear 
industry. Undoubtedly also international bodies need to be 
more prudent than even national governments in their selection 
of the eminent, and to avoid controversial selections.
Despite the transboundary nature of the radioactive cloud 
released from the burning reactor and the European-wide 
concern aroused, the role of the EC is not to be enlarged. 
Against certain non-nuclear nations, such as Ireland, which 
has called for the closure of the Sellafield plant across the 
Irish Sea, demanding greater assurance to be provided by the 
EC in respect of the safety of their neighbours' nuclear power 
plants are ranged France and the UK. These maintain that the 
correct level for responsibility for safety is that of the 
plant owner/operator, licensed by the national authority. 
Whilst the desirability of common basic safety standards is 
widely acknowledged the preferred forum for developing these 
is the IAEA, with the exception of the field of radiation 
protection. Thus a larger role for the EC in regulating 
nuclear safety is most unlikely to come to pass. In the next 
section the role of the IAEA is briefly examined.
The International Atomic Energy Agency
The IAEA is an agency of the United Nations Organisation, 
which was established in 1957 with the principal objective to 
"accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to 
peace, health and prosperity throughout the world". Its work 
has included the issue of basic safety standards for all 
aspects of nuclear power operations. In principle these 
standards are only applicable to the activities of the IAEA 
itself or to bilateral or multilateral ageements between it 
and Member States. They are nonetheless widely accepted.
Under its Nuclear Safety Standards programme (MUSS) the IAEA 
has issued a number of safety guides and codes of practice, 
covering, for instance, design and operation for safety of 
nuclear power plants. It has organised operational safety 
inspection teams (OSART) since the accident at TMI-2 to advise 
nuclear power plant management with a view to increasing 
operational safety. Following Chernobyl the Director-General, 
Hans Blix, proposed that the IAEA basic standards be converted 
into binding norms to be incorporated in national legislation 
and hoped for agreement on basic safety principles (quoted in 
EC EP, 1987c, pi3) .
In the field of radiation protection the Agency first issued 




























































































along with the International Labour Office and the World 
Health Organization after the publication of the ICRP’s 
proposals of 1976. Largely based upon the ICRP's 
recommendations the revised basic safety standard was 
published in 1982, under the joint sponsorship of the other UM 
agencies and the OECD.
These specify that the system of dose limitation must include 
justification of the practice, optimization of radiation 
protection and annual dose equivalent limits. Specifically the 
standards say that "in order to prevent unnecessary exposure, 
no practice involving exposure to ionizing radiation shall be 
authorized by the relevant competent authorities unless the 
introduction of the practice produces a positive net benefit. 
The design, plan and subsequent use and operation of sources 
and practices shall be performed in a manner to ensure that 
exposures are as low as reasonably achievable, economic and 
social factors being taken into account" (IAEA, 1982, p4).
An annex offers practical guidance. "Ideally" it suggests, 
"cost-benefit analysis could be used” in authorising the 
introduction of a practice involving exposure to radiation, 
that is in determining justification. With respect to 
optimization, "the aim of the quantitative analysis should be 
to assess how far exposures may be reduced before further 
reduction would not justify the incremental cost required to 
accomplish it. This assessment may be made by a differential 
cost-benefit analysis" (IAEA, 1982, ppl44~145).
The system recommended does not provide any values for human 
life or as the IAEA put it "the valuation of the change in 
life expectancy of unknown individuals" (IAEA, 1985). However 
to reduce the problems arising from the use of different 
values by national authorities the IAEA lias put forward its 
calculation for justifying transboundary pollution from 
.routine emissions. On the basis of ICRP risk factors for the 
induction of fatal cancer (1.25 x 10~2 Sv-1) and for induction 
of severe hereditary harm in all generations (8 x lO"2 Sv-1 ) , 
the IAEA calculated the expected loss of healthy life 
attributable to a radiation dose of 1 person Sv. Applying 
these risk factors to averages for loss of life from one case 
of radiation-induced lethal cancer and for loss of life from 
one case of a hereditary disease of 15 and 30 years 
respectively, the IAEA suggest that 0.4 person years is lost 
for each dose of 1 person Sv.
Assigning a minimum reference value for "objective health 
detriment" is achieved by multiplying 0.4 by Gross National 
Product per head and adding the cost of additional health 
care. Since standards of living differ between countries, 
giving in this case a range of values between $200 per person 
Sv (parts of Asia) and $5 000 per person Sv (USA), the IAEA 
recommended a minimum reference value of $3 000 per person Sv 
with the anticipation that regulators from affluent countries 
would choose higher values (IAEA, 1985, pp5-7). At the risk 



























































































minimum figure is about $150 000 [$3 000/0.0205].
This is the only example of an international organisation 
going further than simply recommending the principle of cost- 
benefit analysis. Whilst forming part of its basic safety 
standards the fact that the document is the product of an 
advisory group drawn from the OECD, WHO and national 
regulatory bodies demonstrates the essentially consensus 
approach adopted by the Agency. It is also important to note 
that the IAEA minimum figure makes no attempt to value the 
ICRP's so-called subjective health detriment. In the 
subsequent section we can see how the UK has attempted to 





























































































REGULATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Background
The United Kingdom has a capitalist market economy, developed 
over two centuries of industrial growth. With a relatively 
well-organised trade union movement since the end of the 19th 
century and a history of liberal social reform, industrial 
safety has long been an area of policy-making. Nuclear power 
was introduced relatively soon after its potential as a source 
of power was recognised. As one of the permanent members of 
the UN Security Council and with the pretensions of being a 
world power stemming from its history as an old imperialist 
nation the UK armed itself with nuclear weapons in the early 
1950s. The first reactors (Magnox GCRs) built in the 1950s and 
1960s were dual-purpose, to produce weapons-grade plutonium as 
well as electrical power, or having the potential to do so.
For strategic reasons the government funded its own reactor 
designs until the early 1980s. The place of nuclear power in 
the UK's energy situation is shown in Table 2. As a result of 
a shift in the main electricity producer's thinking and the 
election of a Conservative government less willing to support 
British designed and manufactured nuclear plant, the Energy 
Minister gave approval to the construction of a PWR at 
Sizewell in 1987. This followed a major public inquiry held 
under site planning procedures (IEA, 1987, p429). Two further 
PWRs are to be installed before 2000. A significant movement 
against nuclear power has emerged, without which the public 
inquiries into the establishment of the Sellafield 
reprocessing plant for AGR fuel (THORP) and the the PWRs at 
Sizewell and Hinkley Point would not have become important 
areas of political debate.
Notwithstanding the nationalism which underpinned many of the 
decisions regarding the development of nuclear power, those 
leading the industry traditionally play a significant role 
internationally. The ICRP itself has had a strong British 
presence in its ranks. It will be argued that British 
regulations are the clearest example of the ICRP system in 
operation.
Safety regulation
One of the earliest control philosophies was the principle of 
best practicable means, introduced to curb air pollution in 
1863. When this legislation was updated in 1956 best 
practicable means was defined in terms of financial 
implications and the current state of technical knowledge 
(Webb, 1987, p7). During the late 1960s and early 1970s Labour 
and Conservative governments comprehensively reviewed 
occupational and public safety, leading to the passing of the 
Health and Safety at Work etc Act of 1974. This established a 
tripartite Health and Safety Commission, made up of three 
equal groups, employers, trade unions and others drawn from 




























































































the Department of Employment for the administration of the Act 
which places a primary obligation upon employers "to ensure, 
so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and 
welfare" of workers and the public (Bischof, 1984, p83). The 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is appointed by the 
Commission and is the licensing and inspecting authority for 
most industries.
A particular feature of the Commission's approach is the 
stress upon consensus decision-making. Its origins lie partly 
in the history of the Commission's establishment. The report 
commissioned by the government on safety and health at work 
was drawn up in an atmosphere "where looking after people was 
the primary aim and the question of finding the resources to 
do it was given much less weight" (Singleton, 1983, pl58). 
Moreover it maintained that there was "a greater natural 
identity of interest between 'the two sides' [that is, 
employers and trade unions] in relation to safety and health 
problems than on most other matters" (Robens, 1972, p21). On 
the Commission itself, local authority and trade union 
representatives agreed only to proceed with regulations with 
the approval of the employers: giving the latter an effective 
veto (Wilson, 1986, p293). In terms of enforcement strategy, 
inspectors seek to to persuade rather than coerce employers 
and much relies on their interpretation of what is reasonably 
practicable.
The principle of so far as reasonably practicable (ALARP) has 
been tested in the English courts, where a long standing 
interpretation still holds good. "It is a narrower term than 
'physically possible' and implies that a computation must be 
made in which the quantum of risk is placed in one scale and 
the sacrifice, whether in money time or trouble, involved in 
the measures necessary to avert the risk is placed in the 
other: and that if it be shown that there is a gross 
disproportion between them, the risk being insignificant in 
relation to the sacrifice, the person on whom the duty is laid 
discharges the burden of proving that compliance was not 
reasonably practicable" (Webb, 1987, pp7-8).
It follows from this principle of UK safety law that there is 
a stiffer test to be applied than the ICRP's ALARA supported 
by the balancing of costs and benefits. The test is one of 
gross disproportion that, in the Health and Safety Executive's 
words, "err on the side of safety" (HSE, 1988, p5). This is 
not an insignificant distinction, despite the clear similarity 
of meaning between the words achievable, feasible and 
practicable. In the IISE's opinion AI.ARA and ALARP are "broadly 
equivalent provided that the interpretation of ALARA [is] 
consistent with the philosophy that radiation risks should be 
reduced below the balance point ... [with] the imbalance ... 
expected to increase as the level of individual risk 
increases" (Harbison and Winyard, 1987, p27).
After the promulgation of the EC's Council Directive of 1980, 




























































































the HSE. In their current form these state that "the 
responsible person shall, in relation to the work with 
ionising radiation which he undertakes, take all reasonably 
practicable steps to restrict the extent to which all persons 
are exposed to radiation" (HSE, 1985). The ALARP formula is 
also found in the USE'S fundamental principles relating to 
radiation protection:
(1) No person shall receive doses in excess of the 
appropriate dose equivalent limit as a result of 
normal operation;
(2) The exposure of persons shall be kept as low as is 
reasonably practicable;
(3) Having regard to principle (2), the collective dose 
equivalent to operators and to the general public as 
a result of operation of the nuclear installation 
shall be kept as low as is reasonably practicable;
(4) All reasonably practicable steps shall be taken to 
prevent accidents;
(5) All reasonably practicable steps shall be taken to 
minimise the radiological consequences of any 
accident" (HSE, 1982).
It will be recalled that the EC deems that the principle of 
justification of a practice is satisfied by the existence of 
regulations licensing activity involving radiation. The UK's 
Health and Safety Executive is the competent authority for 
regulating nuclear installations. Its Director-General 
explained the HSE's role in deciding whether or not to have 
nuclear power: "It is not for us to propose nuclear power; it 
is for others to come to us saying they want to contruct a 
reactor. Our function is to examine the risks involved, as 
■estimated by experts, and to consider whether what is proposed 
can be improved and to what extent it is worth doing" 
(Rimington, 1988, p3). In his position he does not "have to 
have an opinion on nuclear power" (interview with John 
Rimington 15 December 1988). "Only the political organs of the 
state are capable of determining what:, and which, risks are 
tolerable" (Rimington, 1987, p26). Such an approach does not 
rule out banning a dangerous activity, but the test is not 
overall net benefit but the cost of further risk reduction.
Although the HSC/HSE has the leading role in regulating 
nuclear power plants, two ministries are involved in 
prescribing standards of protection. The Department of the 
Environment and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food set and monitor emission limits and food contamination 
standards. One actor is missing: the Department of Health 
plays no direct part in nuclear power plant safety regulation, 
but is limited to advising government on the health impact of 
the industry. Nor is there any regulatory requirement for or 




























































































services set up by employers (Gevers, 1985, p220).
Case study: the Sizewell B PWR and cost-benefit analysis
The proposal by the Central Electricity Generating Board 
(CEGB) to construct Britain's first Pressurised Water Reactor 
at Sizewell illustrates the methods employed by the designers 
and regulators to assess and assure safety. As the plant owner 
and operator the CEGB laid down its Design Safety Criteria to 
be followed by the designers, Westinghouse Electric 
Corporation and the Bechtel Corporation who had designed the 
SNUPPS version of the PWR built for several US utilities.
These included design targets for exposure. For occupational 
exposure two targets were set: an annual target for the 
effective dose equivalent for individuals of 10 mSv and an 
annual target for the station collective effective dose 
equivalent of 2 person mSv per MW(e) installed capacity 
(equating to 2.4 person Sv per year). Both these targets were 
set at more stringent levels than was being achieved on 
average by existing nuclear power plants (GCRs). There were 
also targets set for emissions affecting the public to meet 
regulatory requirements (Pepper and Dutton, 1984, p262-264). 
For instance, under the HSE Nuclear Installations 
Inspectorate's Principles for Safety Assessment design basis 
accidents carrying a risk of 3 x 10~3 per year have a maximum 
consequence of exposure of 100 mSv per event to people nearby 
(Cave, 1988, pl2).
The CEGB put forward its initial design approacli to the HSE in 
1982. However the HSE asked the CEGB to demonstrate that it 
had made reasonable attempts to quantify its ALARP judgements 
by the use of cost-benefit analysis along the lines 
recommended by the ICRP (Harbison and Winyard, 1986, pl62). 
This put the CEGB in a quandary since ICRP have not valued the 
benefit of risk reduction (the value of life) and there was a 
need to reach agreement on the relationship of ALARA to ADARP. 
In the end HSE agreed to accept figures which the CEGB based 
upon a discussion document issued by the National Radiological 
Protection Board (NRPB).
Operator and regulator also agreed to apply cost-benefit 
analysis only to design features aimed at reducing exposures 
during normal operation. This excluded a cost-benefit analysis 
of the overall design - which was a standard US one, the 
SNUPPS - or to major accidents (Harbison and Vlinyard, 1986, 
pl64-165). Agreement was not readied on the starting point: 
the predicted occupational exposure. The CEGB were predicting 
2.3 person Sv per year in line with their target. HSE's more 
cautious estimate took into account that such a figure would 
put the Sizewell plant amongst the best 10% of operating PWRs 
in the USA (Harbison and Winyard, 1986, pl67). Nevertheless 
the exercise was the most comprehensive ever undertaken in the 
UK.
In the operator's view the design was based "on the 




























































































design features involving "a capital expenditure ... up to 10 
times higher than would be justified on the basis of balancing 
detriment and cost. ... Compliance with the criteria and 
design guidelines results in a design which is to a much 
higher standard than would be justified by a cost-benefit 
balance ... [of] more than a thousand times" for some features 
(Pugh and others, 1987, p61).In other words the CEGB had 
demonstrated that their design targets already passed the test 
of gross disproportion. Yet this , of course begs the question 
of whether the NRPB's values for life were appropriate.
The value of life
The National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) is 
responsible for carrying out research and development and 
providing information, advice and services to organisations 
using radioactive sources and materials. It is required by the 
government to give advice whenever recommendations are made by 
the ICRP. There is indeed an overlap of membership between the 
ICRP and the NRPB.
In 1980 the NRPB began a programme to offer advice on the 
application of a quantitative framework to the optimization of 
radiation protection. This programme is ongoing with the aim 
of extending the advice already given from day to day 
operational situations to ones involving major accidents. The 
Board first issued a consultation document on the application 
of cost-benefit analysis to protecting the public from 
radiation (NRPB, 1980). A provisional framework was then 
proposed followed by another consultation document, this time 
on occupational exposure (NRPB, 1981b and NRPB, 1982). The two 
frameworks have since been brought together in NRPB (1986), 
but will be revised due to changes in the ICRP risk factors 
assumed following re-evaluations of the doses received by the 
survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
NRPB argue that it is necessary to establish a minimum 
reference value of the cost to society from health detriment 
(a unit of harm from radiation exposure). This is the only 
cost assigned to very low doses. For reasons of "equity, risk 
aversion and legislative requirements" progressively higher 
costs are assigned to higher doses (NRPB, 1981b). By this they 
mean that those most exposed should receive greater 
protection, which can be encouraged if the benefits from that 
(costlier) protection are commensurately larger. It is also 
consistent with English law's test of gross disproportionality 
(ALARP). In the earlier framework this was achieved by a 
system of bands for levels of exposure, but the latest version 
employs a curve to multiply reference values according to 
risk. For ease of exposition this paper will use the bands.
The NRPB estimated the value of life according to what it 
termed the "human capital" approach. A worker is viewed as an 
asset, whose use adds value to output. Essentially this 
approach involves costing the net loss of future output from 




























































































individuals. This has been the approach traditionally used by 
UK government departments, pioneered by the Department of 
Transport’s valuations of the costs of road accidents.
Many theoretical and practical objections can be levelled at 
this approach. A dead person neither produces nor consumes, 
but at the time the decision about investment is being made 
the potential victim is alive and should be valued as such. To 
a firm a worker's value added is measured by net output, that 
is offsetting the wage paid against the value of the work. But 
from society's point of view the loss of a person's 
consumption (or spending power) is also material. Thus, it can 
be argued, the potential victim should be valued in terms of 
gross, not net, output. Valuing the contribution made to 
society by people not in paid work is likely to be arbitrary 
and contentious: the NRPB valued the output of housewives at 
the average annual wage of employed women and set the value of 
childrens' and pensioners’ output at zero (NRPB, 1980, p43).
As a way of valuing life it is flawed, since it actually based 
on valuing the output of paid work. Despite this, it is a 
method which gives results: it is calculable.
Welfare economists argue that it is people's willingness to 
pay for investment in benefits or compensation to those who 
incur costs (harm) that should determine the value of life. 
However both revealed preference studies (deriving implicit 
values from actual circumstances) and contingent value studies 
(using questioning to elicit preferences from hypothetical 
situations) give values differing by several orders of 
magnitude. The fault, if fault it is, appears to lie in the 
perception of risk. Whether workers or any other agents 
actually have a full appreciation of the risks they face is a 
moot question, whilst their behaviour often results from being 
in a position of price-taker. Decisions on paying for health 
or life insurance are affected both by perceptions as to the 
significance and consequence of the threat being insured 
against and the individual’s ability to pay the premium. It is 
also difficult to understand measures of risk, especially 
where only small changes are involved and the situation is 
patently unreal. Results displaying a willingness to pay very 
high amounts in respect of nuclear hazards perhaps reflect an 
attitude of "nuclear power? not at any price". Willingness to 
pay methods for valuing life are income/wealth and perception 
biased and, perhaps not surprisingly, show wide variations 
when measurement is attempted.
Whatever these objections it can at least be said that the 
NRPB's method was consistent witli that employed by other 
government departments, and, it will be seen, arriving at 
the same value. This answers the point made by Dobbs (1985 
that the consistency principle requires that independent 
decision-makers should agree to use a common shadow price 
single good or agree to reduce the extent of their shadow 
































































































is dominated by budget constraints. One significant area of 
difference however is the NRPB's use of a 3% discount rate 
rather than the 5% employed by the public sector generally.
Due to the inter-generational nature of harm caused by 
radiation the Treasury gave the NRPB special dispensation to 
use the lower figure. Using a positive rate of discount is in 
itself a controversial matter, since, even at low rates the 
cost of harm to succeeding generations is valued at almost 
zero.
Applying the ICRP's risk factors (see page 25), the NRPB 
proposed the following costs of unit collective dose 
equivalent:
Individual dose equivalent Cost of unit collective
dose band (roSv) (£/person Sv)
< 0.05 for 2 000
0.05-0.5 ! members of 10 000
0 . 5 - 5 _______________ the public_____ 50 000
< 5 for 4 000
5 - 1 5  I radiation 20 000
15-50 workers 100 000
Costs are in 1980 prices, based on using a 3% discount 
rate.
At the ICRP risk factors for somatic and genetic harm, the 
minimum value of life implied is £100 000 (£2 000/0.0205). A
re-evaluation of these risk factors by the NRPB and taking 
into account price inflation has led the NRPB to increase 
their minimum value to £10 000/person Sv or, as can be 
calculated, nearly £250 000 per life (£10 000/0.045) (see 
NRPB, 1988, pl3-15). However the NRPB claim to now be using a 
value for life of £500 000 (interview with Tony Wrixon, NRPB 
on 22 December 1988). The discrepancy apparently arises 
because the NRPB are using the old risk factors (summing to 
0.0205); hence £10 000/0.02 = £500 000. Were they to be 
consistent the minimum reference value per person Sv would 
have to be about £23 000 (£23 000/0.045 = £500 000). The fact 
is that until the ICRP has completed its review the NRPB's 
advice is called interim and its valuation on life obscured.
Changes in the NRPB' s advice is not to be seen in isolation 
from developments in government departments and the HSE. For 
some years the Department of Transport used a value of life 
figure of under £250 000 (Davies, 1988, p41). This figure was 
criticised by proponents of the willingness to pay approach 
and differences between government departments were exploited 
by objectors at the Sizewell B Public Inquiry. Following a 
review of the literature by the Department’s Economic Adviser, 
a new figure of £500 000 was announced (interview with Neil 
Davies, HSE Economic Adviser on 20 January 1989). The HSE has 
not recommended a figure for the value of life because the 
Commission is divided, with trade union representatives 
strongly opposed to the use of cost-benefit analysis in safety 




























































































government's Enterprise and Deregulation Unit to justify all 
proposals for regulatory controls with a structured assessment 
of their likely economic impacts, particularly on businesses 
(Davies, 1988, p35-36). This compliance cost assessment now 
uses similar values for life as those of the Department of 
Transport, although at the Sizewell Inquiry the HSE revealed 
it had been using a figure of £150 000 multiplied by so-called 
aversion factors of up to 10. Thus the NRPB's figures have 
been kept in close alignment with those of the HSE.
The UK therefore has a well developed system of cost-benefit 
analysis for assessing safety measures, including those in the 
nuclear industry. This has been achieved at the expense of 
social consensus however, with workers' representatives and 
pressure groups often fundamentally opposed to this approach 
and revealing widely differing perceptions about risk. 
Furthermore, this breakdown of consensus has taken place at a 
time when several state functions have been privatised and the 
influence of trade unions on tripartite bodies diminished or 
eliminated, for instance in the field of vocational education 
and training. HSC's consensual approach to regulation appears 
already damaged and vulnerable to the pressures from the 































































































Italy has a capitalist market economy lacking indigenous 
energy resources. Although it was one of the first European 
countries to adopt nuclear power in the early 1960s - in 1963 
Italy was the world's third largest producer of nuclear energy 
with three nuclear power plants - this early development was 
not followed up until 1970, when a new nuclear power plant 
project, Caorso, was begun (see IEA, 1987, p248; Ippolito, 
1980, p25 and Renzetti, 1979). This BWR was followed by two 
further BWRs at Montalto di Castro, due for commissioning by 
1991/2. Under the 1985 National Energy Plan a further five 
twin PWR plants, based on a standard design - Progretto 
Unificato Nucleare (PUN) - were to be introduced, and work was 
begun at Trino Vercellese (already the site of an existing PWR 
commissioned in 1964).
Environmental concerns developed during the 1970s, led by 
local authorities [couune] opposed to the siting of plants in 
their area, but nuclear power remained a relatively minor 
political issue. The mood of public opinion was substantially 
altered by the explosion at Chernobyl-4 and a campaign was 
mounted to halt the use of nuclear power. This was achieved in 
1987, when in a referendum over 80% of voters gave Parliament 
the responsibility for overriding the decisions of communes 
and regions on the siting of new power stations, and depriving 
a ministerial committee (CIPE) of its power to intervene in 
the siting procedures. A parliamentary resolution in 1986 had 
already resulted in a moratorium in the nuclear programme, and 
as a result of the referendum and the need to form a majority 
government all nuclear power plants remained shut down 
following safety evaluation reviews and future plans abandoned 
(see IEA, 1988, p257 and Ceri, 1988, p79).
Despite the effective abandonment of nuclear power in Italy, 
it is instructive to examine the approach taken towards 
acceptable risk in the period preceeding 1987. There are 
differences in the system of regulation to that found in the 
UK. Nuclear science, and indeed publicly-funded scientific 
endeavour, has been dominated by theoretical physicists, 
whilst radiation protection and the biological effects of 
radiation have not held as important a place - there have in 
fact been no Italian members of the ICRP in recent times 
(Green, 1984). In addition Italy has always imported its 
nuclear technology from abroad, largely from the USA. The 
position of nuclear power in the Italian energy scene is shown 
in Table 2. Italy also imports nuclear generated electricity 
from France, some of whose nuclear power plants, the complex 
of PWRs at Bugey and the fast reactor at Creys-Malville for 
example, are sited on the other side of the Alps.
Safety regulation




























































































fundamental right to health (Article 32). The establishment of 
a national health service in 1979, the Servizio Sanitario 
Nazionale (SSN), based on the principles of prevention, 
planning and participation, made local health units, Unita 
Sanitarie Locali (USL), responsible for enforcing safety 
legislation (Berlinguer and Biocca, 1987, p462 and de 
Leonardis, 1983, pl52). For radiation protection, a number of 
USLs in an area are organised into joint units [Presidi 
Multizonali di Prevenzione (PMP)] which undertake 
environmental monitoring and general health protection. These, 
during the Chernobyl emergency, especially in the north of 
Italy, were active in controlling the distribution of 
contaminated food. A single set of regulations adopted under 
the act setting up the SSN (Act No. 833 of 23 December 1978) 
governs general work and production standards with a view to 
preventing occupational injuries and diseases (ILO, 1979, 
pl80) .
Regulation of nuclear safety does not fully reside with the 
SSN or the Ministry of Health. Until 1979 the SSN's Higher 
Institute for Health [Istituto Superiore di Sanita (ISS)] was 
charged with protecting the health of the population and 
workers from radiation, including the setting of emission 
standards. However, on the grounds of overlapping 
responsibilities with another agency (ENEA-DISP), this area of 
competence was removed (Liberatore, 1988, pl6). Operating 
permits for hazardous or polluting industrial plants are 
issued by the commune and usually require "best practicable 
means" to be employed to control risk or emissions (OECD,
1987, p49). But in this area too, nuclear power plants are the 
responsibility of ENEA-DISP not the local authority. There are 
no statutory provisions regarding the use of specialist 
occupational health services, but a number of northern regions 
-the "red regions" - have issued guidelines on standards and 
functions (Gevers, 1985, p220; IRS, 1988, p8).
-"As regards radiation protection, much earlier regulations
still apply. Italy has not yet revised its regulations in line 
with the EC Directive of 1980, although in practice the 
organisations operating nuclear power plants and other 
facilities have adopted the standards established by the ICRP 
(Eletti, 1983, p672). Since 1981 the National Energy Plan 
[Piano Energetico Nazionale (PEN)] has made direct reference 
to compliance with the Directive. The relevant legislation is 
that of 1964 (Presidential Decree No. 185) which governs 
matters of nuclear safety and health protection. Article 1 
states that all activities should be carried out "in the most 
effective way calculated to ensure that the health of workers 
and the general population is protected against the dangers of 
ionizing radiation" (Bischof, 1984, p71).
This wording implies some absolute level of safety, since 
protection means to keep safe or secure from danger or harm. 
However Article 66 qualifies this level of safoty by stating 
that "employers must take all appropriate safety and 




























































































j.n mind what is technically feasible" (Bischof, 1984, p72). 
Thus the test in Italian law Is one of effectiveness and as 
low as technically feasible, a test moreover frequently 
advocated by critics of ALARA.
The difficulty with a test such as "as low as technically 
feasible" is that the total elimination of radioactive 
discharges from a nuclear plant is impossible but the 
technology exists to reduce emissions to virtually zero. The 
regulator has no quantifiable point at which to say that a 
satisfactory reduction has been achieved. It is therefore 
said, certainly by the nuclear industry, to be an 
unenforceable test (see, for instance, Webb, 1987, p8).
However in conjunction with a test of effectiveness some 
limits can be applied. A good definition of effectiveness is 
that of the World Health Organization: "the effect of the 
activity and the end results, outcomes or benefits for the 
population achieved in relation to the stated objectives"
(WHO, 1971). Therefore the point at which protection can be 
said to be satisfactory is when the impact of reduced 
emissions meets stated health objectives. Such a point can be 
expressed in terms of target exposure levels, given that 
sieverts relate to risk of harm.
Authorisation of nuclear power plants is given by the Ministry 
of Industry, Commerce and Crafts (MICA) but its licensing and 
inspection responsibilities are in fact devolved. 
Responsibility for regulatory procedures in the field of 
nuclear safety lies with the Comitato Nazionale per la Ricerca 
e lo Sviluppo dell'Energia Nucleare e delle Energie 
Alternative (ENEA! [National Commission for Research and 
Development in Nuclear and Alternative Energy Sources]. Since 
1982 a separate division in fact has this responsibility, 
known as the Central Directorate for Nuclear Safety and 
Radiological Protection (DISP). Although it is an autonomous 
.body of ENEA - which had had the responsibility of promoting 
nuclear power, an objective in potential conflict with its 
regulatory duties - ENEA-DISP remains accountable to the 
Ministry of Industry. ENEA-DISP has published a series of 
technical guides for nuclear operators, although these are not 
binding but issued to provide better understanding of the 
controls exercised in matters of health and safety (NEA/OECD, 
1986, p57).
Regulation in practice
Italian safety philosophy is complicated by the fact that the 
country has imported its nuclear technology. In fact the first 
nuclear power plants were constructed in advance of any 
legislation being passed to ensure radiation protection or 
siting criteria. Even the later Caorso BWR was ordered on a 
turn-key contract. Thus all licensing was based upon reference 
to codes and standards of the country of origin, rather than 
on any national standards (Naschi, 1980, pl6). In practice 
this meant that the safety criteria and guides of the US 




























































































specifications were used. Since these are deterministic 
standards there was no way of ensuring equivalent safety 
objectives for different nuclear power plants. Nor has 
legislation addressed the problem that what is technically 
feasible is constrained by the practice of purchasing nuclear 
power plants designed by the Westinghouse Corporation or 
General Electric.
When defining safety goals or objectives, it is necessary to 
employ probabilistic methods of safety assessment. A goal is 
translatable into the design or operation of the nuclear power 
plant if margins of reliability and safety can be calculated, 
and this is only possible using probabilistic techniques. 
Although safety goals are employed by the US regulatory 
authority they are only used as an adjunct to the licensing 
procedure. However, as we should recall, the test for safety 
under Italian law is well suited to the adoption of safety 
goals as a means of ensuring protection.
Under the FUN project, the design objective for operational 
conditions was established at an individual dose for members 
of the public of 0.1 mSv for one site containing installed 
capacity of 2 000 MW(e), that is two big nuclear power plants. 
For accidental events with a risk of 1 in 10 000, including 
all design basis accidents but not severe accidents like a 
core melt-down, the design objective was 100 mSv per event 
(Benassai, Frittelli and Piermattei, 1986, p53). The objective 
for severe accidents was set at an overall limit of less than 
1 in 100 000 per year. Within these design objectives further 
improvements could be made provided these "entailed reasonable 
burdens". This optimization procedure did not involve cost- 
benefit analysis, although the cost of protection and 
uncertainties associated with the models used were taken into 
account. As a result exemption levels were proposed in the 
order of 0.001 mSv (10 pSv) for individuals (Benassai, 
Frittelli and Piermattei, 1986, pp54-55).
For occupational exposures, the PUN project set a design 
objective for individual workers of 5 mSv per year on average 
and a collective dose target of 4 person Sv per year 
(Benassai, Frittelli and Piermattei, 1986, p55). All these 
design objectives were set on the basis of Italian experience, 
albeit largely from BWRs, and the available technology. The 
Italian safety philosophy rejects the setting of a reference 
value to a person Sv as any monetary value is deceptive given 
the margins of error involved in undertaking a full cost- 
benefit analysis (see Benassai and Bramati, 1984, p251,
Eletti, 1983, p675 and Naschi, 1980, pl6).
In consequence the process of optimization of protection is 
technically led. As the director of ENEA-DISP outlined, "a 
perhaps more correct ... approach to the problem [of reducing 
risk but balancing costs and benefits is] by looking for 
approximate solutions. ... In a technological field, a method 
that is both valid and capable of giving progressively better 




























































































achievable" can ... be done through recourse to the best 
utilization of the available experimental technology, when a 
significant experimental basis is available" (Naschi, 1980, 
pl6) .
This same approach can be seen to be applied in respect of the 
existing nuclear power plants, constructed by reference to 
country of origin standards. Backfitting is the term used to 
describe the post-construction implementation of additional 
safety features. The philosophy adopted by ENEA-DISP was to 
use the new regulations as a reference to be "met as far as 
practically achievable ... related to good engineering 
judgement" (Eletti, 1983, p675). Thus designs imported from 
the USA and designed according to seismic hazard criteria 
applicable for North America had to be reassessed to cope with 
those likely to be found in the Mediterranean region. As a 
result the Latina CGR was modified and the Garigliano BWR shut 
down.
Although cost-benefit analysis is not carried out to assess 
the efficiency of radiation protection in advance, specific 
improvements have been costed out in terms to give a value per 
person sievert. A shield wall at Caorso constructed to reduce 
lifetime occupational exposure from 2.6 to 0.6 person Sv per 
year cost about $20 000/person Sv (Benassai and Bramati, 184, 
p255-256). At the risk factors prevailing at that time this 
implies a value for life of nearly $1 million 
($20 000/0.0205).
j The Italian approach to nuclear safety regulation has placed
I little reliance upon the use of cost-benef-it—anaiysTs as a 
means of justification or optimization. Until the early 1980s 
there was little political or social pressure on the nuclear 
industry to justify the use of nuclear power, particularly on 
a quantifiable basis, with, for instance, trade unions 
relatively quiesecent on the safety issue and favouring 
' nuclear power. Instead there has been a development of the 
philosophy of safety goals, themselves requiring the use of 
probabilistic risk assessment. The motives behind this 
approach lie in the need to avoid the problems caused by 
adopting the country of origin methodology. Despite its own 
acknowledged problems, probabilistic risk assessment was 
employed to evaluate the Caorso (for backfitting) and Montalto 
nuclear power plants, and was to be used in the licensing 
procedures for the PUN project (Eletti, 1983).
Of course the goals themselves are nothing more than risk 
targets, but set according to, largely engineering, judgements 
as to what is technologically feasible. Nonetheless, through 
probabilistic risk assessment, they are goals and judgements 
open to scrutiny. An increasing polarisation of views on 
nuclear power in the 1980s also provides a backdrop to 
reliance upon the criteria of "as low as technically 
feasible", since this test appears to bypass the need for 
justification of risk on the basis of a trade-off between 



























































































placing a value upon saving life from the hazards of a 
technology rejected by a significant proportion of citizens 
clearly invalidates the effectiveness of cost-benefit analysis 































































































Hungary has a socialist planned economy, though a determined 
effort has been under way to introduce markets into many 
sectors. Electrification was seen as a priority by economic 
planners, and a major programme was embarked upon to raise its 
contribution from its 1950 share of 21% of total energy 
consumption. Until 1960 coal provided nearly 100% of 
electrical power (Szili and others, 1977, p34j . Through the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and multilateral 
agreements, Hungary came to rely upon energy imports from the 
Soviet Union. The Druzhba [Friendship] oil pipeline and the 
Mir [Peace] electric power grid, both completed in the 1960s, 
and the Bratstvo [Brotherhood] gas network in the 1970s 
provided the infrastructure for energy transfers.
In 1965-66 the USSR concluded agreements with a number of CMEA 
countries to provide technical assistance and fuel for their 
own nuclear power programmes. Though these agreements were not 
put in hand at the time, Hungary and the USSR resurrected the 
project to install four VVER-440 MW(e) nuclear power plants in 
the 1970s, by which time the first such reactor was operating 
at Novovoronezh. This followed the 1971 CMEA agreement on a 
Complex Programme to develop socialist economic integration, 
thus moving from a regime of co-operation to planned 
industrial specialisation (Kramer, 1986; Sobell, 1984, ppl6-18 
and 145). As Table 2 shows, Hungary remains highly dependent 
upon imported electricity, largely from nuclear power plants 
located in the Ukraine. A sharp rise in the price charged for 
Soviet oil and gas in 1973 hit the Hungarian economy hard. 
Economic reformers have pointed to the constraints imposed 
upon growth by a large energy import bill (Antal and others, 
1988, pl3). Under severe fiscal pressure state subsidies are 
being cut in the energy sector. But priority is being given to 
the expansion of the nuclear power and lignite-fuelled power 
station programmes, with closures of deep-mined coal capacity 
(FT Business Information, 1988, 257 and 269).
Preparations for construction of the country's first nuclear 
power plant began in 1973. It was decided to create a nuclear 
park at Paks, where all nuclear power plants would be built 
(Szili and others, 1977, p35). The local population was not 
informed of the risks involved until after construction had 
started in 1978 and special efforts had to be made by the 
authorities to explain the safety system and calm fears 
(interview with Béla Horvath, Deputy Head of SzOT Safety 
Department on 18 November 1988). Further expansion of the site 
is planned with contracts signed with the USSR's 
Atomenergoexport for two VVER-1000 MW(e) plants, to enter 
service in 1994 and 1996 respectively (Ravasz, 1988).
Safety regulation




























































































class is the leading class of society" and safety has been 
seen as an absolute goal under the control of the working 
class. Until 1984 responsibility for occupational safety was 
exercised by the trade unions, organised in the Central 
Council of Trade Unions (SzOT). Slogans, such as " human life 
cannot be measured in forints", were the order of the day 
(interview with Gyozo Wiegand, General Manager, Technical 
Inspection, AEEF on 17 November 1988). Much has been changing 
in the 1980s, including the possibility of removing the 
"leading role" clause, but without this background it is not 
possible to understand the Hungarian system of regulation of 
nuclear safety.
Legislation covering nuclear safety was promulgated in 1980, 
well before Paks-1 went critical at the end of 1982; although 
radiation protection had been necessary in uranium mines, 
hospitals and laboratories well before. The Atomic Energy Act 
of 5 April 1980 states:
(a) "In the Hungarian People's Republic, the applications 
of nuclear energy, the related research and 
development shall serve the interests of the society 
as a whole. Nuclear energy may only be used in a way 
that does not result in any damage to human life, to 
the health and living conditions of present and 
future generations, to man's environment and material 
goods."
(b) "Within the permitted dose-limits, radiation exposure 
shall be reduced to a level as low as reasonably 
achievable."
(c) "Exposure of workers employed in nuclear energy 
applications and of the population to all sources of 
radiation must not result in annual doses exceeding 
the dose-limits permitted by the relevant regulations 
[laid down by the Ministry of Health] on the basis of 
the current level of knowledge and the 
recommendations of competent national and 
international advisory bodies" (Sztanyik and Bojtor, 
1982, p606).
As Sztanyik has pointed out this law includes two of the 
ICRP's principles, but excludes that of justification of 
practice (Sztanyik and Bojtor, 1982, p606). It proved to be 
impossible to introduce the concept of acceptable risk into 
Hungarian law and instead maximum safety has to be guaranteed 
(interview with Dr. Laszlo B. Sztanyik, Director, National 
Research Institute for Radiobiology and Radiohygiene on 17 
November 1988) .
Under the Labour Code, employers are obliged to "take every 
available measure for the prevention of any danger threatening 
the health and safety of workers employed" (Sztanyik and 
Bojtor, 1982, pp606-607). It also confers on enterprise trade 




























































































that any action taken by the enterprise is in violation of the 
regulations respecting working conditions or that the 
treatment of workers offends socialist morality" (quoted in 
ILO, 1984, p67). Trade unions have the right, infrequently 
used, to interupt work where there is a probable hazard and to 
receive compensation for the time they strike (ILO, 1985 and 
interview cited above).
Until 1984 trade unions had a dual function of both enforcing 
safety regulations and protecting the interests of their 
members. By a Decree of the Council of Ministers (No. 
1010/1984/III.31) a national Occupational Safety Inspection 
Unit was established, taking over the work of the SzOT Labour 
Safety Affairs Department (ILO, 1985 and Noti, 1987, p83). The 
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare was given responsibility 
for developing a national plan for occupational health 
protection and operates through the County Sanitary 
Epidemiological Inspectorates (ILO, 1985 and interview with 
Sztanyik cited above). The change in control by the trade 
unions is described as moving from authoritative to social 
control.
Such social control is now backed by an increased role in 
enterprise planning, including the right to form union 
committees for safety and social policy, to participate in 
enterprise safety precaution reviews and to approve programmes 
relating to working and living conditions at a general meeting 
of all members (ILO, 1983, p332; Marton, 1987 and interview 
with Horvath cited above). The right to strike however is not 
guaranteed by the Constitution, which indeed specifies (in 
Article 65) that trade unions exist "for the protection of 
order and achievement of socialism, for increased 
participation in socialist construction work ... [and] for the 
implementation of the rights and obligations of the people" 
(quoted in ILO, 1984, p38). A mixed agenda, which, as will be 
seen in the next section, makes for a participatory rather 
than an adversarial role in industrial relations.
With the removal of occupational safety enforcement from the 
trade unions to state bodies, Hungarian regulatory 
institutions formally resemble those in most OECD countries. A 
decentralised system of regulatory authorities was established 
in 1979. The National Supervisory Authority of Energetics and 
Energy Safety (AEEF), which is accountable to the Ministry of 
Heavy Industry, has the responsibility for approving the 
preliminary safety analysis report submitted by the nuclear 
power plant owner and licensing operation (Nyerges, 1986 and 
Szonyi and Nyerges, 1988). Its general tasks involve also the 
elaboration of codes and guides for safe construction and 
operation, aiding the qualification of organisations and the 
training of the utility's inspection staff, and participation 
in the standardisation work of the CMEA.
Notwithstanding its delegated powers from the Ministry of 
Heavy Industry, the AEEF has to report to the State 




























































































necessary consensus among the authorities at the main stages 
of the licensing procedure" (Szonyi and Nyerges, 1988). 
Essentially this ensures close political control over the 
introduction of nuclear power plants. The Committee includes 
representatives from the trade unions, consumer protection 
groups and county and municipal authorities.
As for environmental protection generally. Article 57 of the 
Constitution establishes the right to an environment "worthy 
of human beings". Detailed regulation on several fields is in 
hand under the terms of the Protection of the Human 
Environment Act of 1976, with radioactive emission limits 
fixed for air and water and monitoring of concentrations in 
the environment and agricultural produce by appropriate 
ministries. Under the Act "adequate measures" must be taken to 
prevent pollution (Sztanyik, 1985, pl60; Wright, 1982).
Regulation in practice
Starting late in development of nuclear power the Hungarian 
regulatory authorities were able to benefit from the 
experience gained elsewhere. Their starting point was to apply 
international standards to the Paks project, described as 
"western standards" while taking into account Soviet 
regulations (interview^with Gyozo Wiegand, General Manager 
Technical Inspection, AEEF on 17 November 1988). This was made 
easier as the USSR had supplied a similar LWR to Finland, but 
the Soviet safety philosophy and design was subject to 
considerable modification. The design basis accident was 
changed from a medium size loss of coolant accident to a more 
severe melt down. Special emergency core cooling systems and a 
containment and containment cooling system were included 
(Voross, 1984, pp3-6).
The AEEF developed codes and standards for use in the design, 
manufacture and construction of the nuclear power plants.
These included a quality assurance code and general and 
specific technical safety codes, based on Soviet 
specifications and IAEA NUSS publications (Nyerges, Szonyi and 
Czoch, 1985, p39). Some 30% of the plant was manufactured in 
the USSR, including the primary and secondary circuits and the 
complete control and instrumentation system. Czechoslovak 
manufacturers supplied the reactor pressure vessel and certain 
other major components while Hungarian industry took about 40% 
of the work (Voross, 1984, p4). Although AEEF were satisfied 
with the quality control exercised in Czechoslovakia, 
manufacturing problems were encountered in the USSR for which 
they compensated by insisting upon undertaking extensive 
testing of all components (interview with Pal Nyerges, Chief 
Nuclear Inspector, AEEF on 17 November 1988).
The nature of the difficulties encountered by AEEF in the 
Soviet Union are illuminated by Valeri Legasov's testament, 
made before he committed suicide in April 1988. Legasov had 
headed the investigation into the Chernobyl disaster and in a 




























































































industry. Amongst the charges he made was that the industry’s 
scientific design and construction organisations do not co­
ordinate sufficiently, leading to shortcomings in plant 
quality and violations of essential station design (FT 
Business Information, 1988, 265). Safety culture in socialist 
countries has also led to problems. Traditional practice has 
been to avoid admitting that industrial practices carry a 
risk. Strict prescriptions are therefore laid down, but are 
violated in order to maintain ouput. Thus when accidents 
happen culprits need to identified and blamed. In consequence 
failures are hidden and defects go unreported (interview with 
Wiegand and Gusztav Jancsik, Deputy Manager AEEF on 17 
November 1988). That this is a widespread problem affecting 
quality and permitted by the fact that in the CMEA countries a 
sellers' market dominates is also the conclusion of Pecsi 
(1981, p27-28).
Such a safety culture, or lack of it, poses significant 
difficulties for the development of probabilistic safety 
analysis. In Hungary these techniques have been under 
development at the Institute for Electrical Power Research 
(VEIKI) since 1982. In order to obtain reliability data from 
the operations at Paks a computer system was established for 
recording technical data and unusual events (Szabados and 
Voross, 1986, pp4-5). However this is still not functioning 
six years after Paks-1 was commissioned through lack of 
training of site personnel and possible reluctance to report 
failures. Nor is Soviet reliability data available to VEIKI 
and the CMEA’s joint data bank is not yet functioning despite 
three reorganisations of the Permanent Commission for the Use 
of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes aimed to achieve this, 
since no country appears willing to share failure data.
Despite these problems the Hungarian authorities intend to 
apply probabilistic safety analysis to the licensing of Paks-5 
and 6. In the meantime a probabilistic risk assessment was 
made in respect of a loss of coolant accident in the Paks 
VVER-440 plants using the MARCH 2 computer code developed by 
Battelle and LWR data available from the IAEA (Szabados and 
Voross,1986, p5 and Techy and others, 1988). Not surprisingly 
the use of failure rates from mainly Westinghouse designed 
PWRs led to similar risk assessments to those of PWRs - a case 
of junk in, junk out.
Probabilistic safety analysis is viewed as one method of 
determining the optimal allocation of resources available for 
risk reduction over different energy sources (Voross, 1984, 
p9) but absence of the use of cost-benefit analysis makes it 
hard to see this occurring in the near future. In the context 
of Hungarian safety law the valuation of a person seivert is 
impossible and so explicit cost-benefit analysis is not 
employed. As in Italy exposure targets are set, based upon 
ICRP recommendations and IAEA basic safety standards. For the 
public, the annual dose must not exceed 0.25 mSv per 1000 
MW(e) of installed nuclear power plant capacity for day to day 




























































































For occupational exposures a trigger or checking level of 
0.2 mSv per day is used with a reporting level of 1 mSv, the 
latter requiring special permission for it to occur and a 
medical examination for the individual and investigation if an 
unplanned dose is received. Radiation protection regulations 
required the approval of the trade unions and, at the 
workplace, company safety rules are similarly approved. A five 
year plan for investment and improvements in work safety has 
to have, like all investment and enterprise plans, the 
approval of the company trade union committee. The 
relationship between management and unions at the Paks Atomic 
Power Plant Company (PAV) was described by a senior manager as 
like a marriage, with both parties having to live together day 
by day (interviews with Janos Marton, Project Manager and 
Joszef Katz , Chair of the TU Work Safety Committee on 16 
November 1988). Both company and union saw a common interest 
in minimizing radiation exposure and conflicts over the 
application of resources had to be settled by consensus at 
company level or higher. Each accepted the regulations issued 
by the Ministry of Health.
Despite a legal obligation to cause no harm, in practice the 
Hungarian system of regulation is little different from that 
in Italy or the UK. Its distinguishing feature is that the 
optimizing of the level of risk is formally a matter of joint 
decision between the workforce and management. However the 
non-adversarial role of the trade union movement means that 
responsibility for resource allocation is shared unequally, 
since the unions are not in a realistic way able to affect the 
overall resources available to the enterprise except through 
sacrificing wages. An underdeveloped democracy also has 
difficulty in validating citizen acceptance of the risks 




























































































COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS 
General
The examples of regulatory approaches from the EC, Hungary, 
Italy and the UK illustrate differing attempts at deciding 
acceptable risk. That of the EC reflects its attempt to 
achieve consensus between Member States and the social 
partners by means of deference to Science - the wisdom of the 
ICRP in this instance. The Community prescribes a process (the 
rules of the game) whereby acceptability can be arrived at, 
leaving Member States to determine for themselves the nature 
and degree of risk to be accepted by their populations. In 
recognition at least of the need to strengthen dialogue 
between the social partners themselves and with the Commission 
and the Council, the Community has, in 1987, included 
radiation protection within the terms of reference of the 
tripartite Advisory Committee on Safety, Hygiene and Health 
Protection, but large differences remain on the principles for 
health protection and the appropriateness of nuclear power.
In Hungary the safety standards adopted are those agreed 
internationally (also those of the ICRP) but with an—explicit 
rejection that a value can be placed upon.-human life. This 
leaves the way open for actual safety levels to be determined 
through the political process, until now by means of achieving 
social consensus between government agencies, management and 
trade unions - the top echelons of each being under the 
influence of the Hungarian Socialist Workers', Party (MSzMP)_.
Recognition of the lack of social consensus in placing a value 
upon human life has in Italy contributed to a reliance upon 
safety goals, themselves subject to review by the regulatory 
authorities under pressure of technical progress and other 
social pressures. Despite the history of relative harmony 
between employers and trade union representatives on the HSC, 
a breakdown of social consensus in the UK has provided the 
opportunity for the rapid adoption by government and 
regulatory authorities of the value of life approach to 
augment the longstanding principle that risk must be reduced 
by whatever means are reasonably practicable. The potential 
conflict in approaches of the regulatory authorities and trade 
unions has not yet become manifest in the area of radiation 
protection.
Another feature of the case studies is the approach taken 
towards the idea of a trade-off between harm and social — 
benefit. For the EC the trade-off is explicitly accepted in 
principle as being both necessary and, in conditdons-lacking 
an abundance of goods and resources, desirable. In Hungary the 
trade-off is hidden and its desirability denied. Italian 
regulators recognise the need for trade-off but by defining 
targets according to technical criteria disguise its operation 
in economic terms. Whilst in the UK a trade-off is accepted as 
necessary but applied selectively to different industrial 





























































































Nonetheless these examples also display several common 
features. Perhaps this is on the face of it unsurprising given 
the pervasive influence of the ICRP. However an analysis of 
the way this institution operates or its degree of influence 
is beyond the scope of this paper. It remains the case that in 
each of the examples considered, the principle of optimization 
of pr.o_tecti_on from harm finds support, that is, the regulation 
of risk includes a^xaJiiimal—procedure -for risk reduotio-n. Each 
accepts the principle of ALARA though in practice they all set 
safety goals which are subject to social and economic 
assessment to varying degrees. Furthermore the decision-aiding 
technique of probabilistic safety analysis is used in the task 
of risk reduction.
Thinking about acceptable risk
This section seeks to present the analysis in a general form. 
The relationships underlying the construct "acceptable risk" 
are presented graphically. The aim of this analysis is to 
bring together the two strands pursued thus far in this paper: 
the socially determined and the probabilistic nature of 
safety. Two forms of safety are illustrated. The chance of an 
individual being harmed by an industrial activity is termed 
"individual risk" in the literature. "Societal risk" by 
contrast represents the chance of substantial harm suffered by 
a whole population or community. The diagrams are adaptions 
from British, Dutch, US and Soviet literature. They have been 
modified to display the results of risk assessment for a small 
selection of advanced technological systems in an illustrative 
rather than mathematically precise manner.
Since the focus of this paper is upon acceptable risk and the 
role played by cost-benefit analysis in its determination, the 
environmental impact or social or psychological consequences 
of nuclear power plants (and other advanced technological 
systems) are not considered here. Clearly such considerations 
form an important part in defining the acceptability of such 
systems, and the narrower focus adopted here should be seen as 
only one of a set of factors at work.
In the UK the policy debate concerning acceptable risk has 
moved towards adopting a less value-loaded term "tolerability" 
rather than "acceptability", following recommendations made in 
the Layfield Report of the public inquiry into the siting of a 
PWR at Sizewell (Layfield, 1987). It is also a term employed 
by Perrow (1984), as is suggested by the title of his book 
"Normal accidents: living with high risk technologies".
However the approach to risk management adopted in the 
Netherlands continues to use the term maximum acceptable risk 
(van Kuijen, 1988). The distinction is a fine one, 
particularly since in the British definition tolerability 
"refers to a willingness to live with a risk so as to secure 
certain benefits and in the confidence that it is being 




























































































it as negligible ... but rather something we need to keep 
under review and reduce still further if and as we can" (HSE, 
1988, pi).
There is however a shift of emphasis from the assumption of 
positive choice implicit in the term acceptable risk. Or, to 
put the argument more strongly "if it is organisations, not 
individuals, that set the definition of acceptable risk and 
the terms of a cost-benefit payoff, then what is weighed in 
risk analysis may be, as Perrow says, 'not risk, but power'" 
(Clarke, 1988, p31).
Even so, changing the word used to define the boundary between 
those risks that are to be eliminated and those which should 
be minimized does not seem to advance the debate 
significantly. After all, arguments against the concept of 
acceptable risk based upon demonstrating the public's lack of 
choice, or on their (mis)perceptions of the "true" nature of 
risk, do not invalidate the political proposition that 
citizens are entitled to make choices concerning the 
acceptability of risk from technological systems, or that the 
availability of information is a form of empowerment. If risks 
cannot be wholly eliminated from life, then at least there 
must be mechanisms whereby society can decide as to their 
acceptability. Thus the paper will continue to use the term 
"acceptable risk".
Individual risk
The relationship between the maximum acceptable individual 
risk and the process of optimization is illustrated in figure 
4. The form of figure 4 is derived from work undertaken by the 
HSE and the I V Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy (see HSE, 
1988, p9 and p24 and Babaev and others, 1986, p481). A 
comparison is made with a similar exposition of risk criteria 
for the policy on external safety in the Netherlands (van 
Kuijen, 1988, p55). Reference is also made to the work of Rowe 
in the USA.
The starting point for this exposition is the normal death 
rate. The overall level of the risk of death in industrially 
developed countries is about 1 in 100 per year (10~2 per year). 
The lowest risk is for children aged between 5 or 10 and 15 
years: that is 1 in 10 000 (lO*4) per year.
The government of the Netherlands has decided that a new 
location- specific industrial activity will not be allowed if 
it imposes an additional risk of more than 1 in 1 000 000 - 1% 
of 10~4 (van Kuijen, 1988, p46). This risk refers to members of 
the public living outside the industrial plant and not to the 
workers in the plant. In principle it is the same as HSE's 
view that for people living near a nuclear installation a risk 
of between 1 in 1 000 000 and 1 in 100 000 is "just tolerable" 
(HSE, 1988, p24). A risk below 1 in 1 000 000 is "usually" 
accepted without much difficulty in the HSE's opinion. A 




























































































between 10-6 and 10'3) per year (Babaev and others, 1986, 
p481).
Since this level of risk is also one below which only normal 
safety precautions need be taken, figure 4 sets the boundary 
for negligible risk between 1 in 10 000 000 and 1 in 1 000 000 
(10-7 to 10*6) per year. By contrast the Dutch target value for 
negligible risk is 1 in 100 000 000 (10~8) per year. This is a 
particularly strict criterion and is considered 
unrealistically low by, for instance, the USE (interview with 
Dr Adrian Cohen and John Rimington, HSE on 15 December 1988). 
William Rowe, a risk assessment specialist, suggests that 
without net benefit an unacceptable risk is 1 in 10 000 000 
(10_7) and with benefits up to a maximum of 1 in 1000 (10~3) 
(Rowe, 1988, p374).
There is agreement between the British and Soviet regulatory 
approaches to maximum acceptable risk for workers as being 
under 1 in 1 000 (10-3) per year. Nevertheless this is a high 
level of risk, being borne by, for instance, deep sea 
fishermen. Heavy manufacturing and mining carry a risk of 
about 1 in 10 000 (10~4) per year (HSE, 1988, p23). The range 
between the maximum acceptable individual risks for workers 
and the public and negligible levels of risk define the zone 
for optimization of safety measures. Indeed the Soviet 
proposals specifically state that for large risks, implicitly 
those above 1 in 1 000, "the unwillingness of an individual to 
incur involuntary risk should become absolute" (Babaev and 
others, 1986, p473). Beyond this level using the concept 'the 
value of life' is "inadmissible". (In this context involuntary 
risk should be thought of as including occupational risk, 
since both capitalist and socialist societies make paid work a 
condition for full participation in social life. A voluntary 
risk could be one borne through participation in a challenging 
or dangerous sport.)
In the zone where a reduction in risk is desired there is 
scope for using cost-benefit analysis as the method for 
optimization. But it is also possible, though less explicit, 
to achieve the same ends by setting safety goals that become 
progressively tougher as economic enrichment progresses. 
According to the UK's regulatory approach, emissions from a 
nuclear power station (over 1 000 MW(e)) must not carry a risk 
greater than 1 in 100 000 to members of the public living 
nearby during normal operation and should be lowered as far as 
is reasonably practicable. The equivalent Italian target of 
0.1 mSv/year for each 2 000 MW(e) of capacity implies a risk 
of about 1 in 1 000 000. Hungary's target of 0.25 mSv/year for 
each 1 000 MW(e) of capacity means that an individual close to 
the power plant faces a risk of 1 in 500 000. A similar 
analysis could be undertaken for workers' exposure.
Societal risk
A relationship between the maximum acceptable risk and the 




























































































societal risk as well as for individual risk. An attempt is 
shown in figures 5 and 6. The diagrams' origins lie in the 
relationship between the frequency of accidents (f) and their 
consequences (C) developed by Farmer and Kinchin of the UK 
Atomic Energy Authority and Coppola and Hall of the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (see The Royal Society, 1983, p36). In 
the literature these are either referred to as fC lines or FN 
curves, the latter standing for frequency of events (F) 
compared to the number of deaths/numbers (N) harmed. Such 
curves are the subject of considerable doubt due to the 
inadequacies of the data for plant failure, non-quantification 
of human error and modelling difficulties, such as the basis 
for extrapolating exposure-effect relationships to low doses 
and statistical confidence limits and margins of error. 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this presentation, it is not 
necessary to do more than indicate on the map the societal 
risks concerned. Thus no attempt has been made to plot FN 
curves for specific advanced technological systems.
The starting point of the boundaries between unacceptable- 
acceptable-negligible risk zones are the same as those 
pertaining to individual risk. The risk of one person's death 
is taken to be equivalent to the risk faced by any one 
individual. The slope of the boundaries is a matter for 
debate. Should it take into account an increasing aversion to 
ever larger numbers of deaths or provide for an equality of 
misery? The particular slope chosen here reflects the 
recommendation of an HSE Advisory Committee that the chance of 
a serious accident of >10 deaths involving any one major non­
nuclear plant should be less than 1 in 10 000 per year (HSE 
Advisory Committeee on Major Hazards, 1976). This figure 
remains one which the HSE would normally accept (interview 
with Dr Cohen and Mr Rimington, HSE on 15 December 1988). It 
does however imply a willingness to accept the consequences of 
very large disasters, albeit at remote chances of occurrence.
In Rowe's scheme - involving a method of balancing gains and 
losses, the degree of control and the cost-effectiveness of 
risk-management - the zone of acceptable risk extends up to 1 
in 10 000 (10-") but down to 1 in 100 000 000 000 (10->*). In 
fact to be considered acceptable an involuntary risk of >10 
deaths per event is likely to be below 1 in 100 000 000 (10-B) 
(Rowe, 1988, pp327-388). It is not possible to illustrate this 
in figure 5 however as the scheme involves calculating 
specific numbers (termed risk referents) against which actual 
technological systems are compared: no lines can be plotted on 
the map. Whilst the scheme is complicated and uses some 
arbitrary factors to asses the balancing of gains and losses, 
it supports the premise that a zone exists below 10~‘l for 
optimizing precautions.
The map has been further divided, to be sure arbitrarily, into 
zones above and below 1 000 deaths. The zone above this number 
of deaths is designated "catastrophic events"; that below 
"tragic events". The boundary for negligible risk is taken to 




























































































such labelling is subjective. Rowe, for instance, designates 
ten or more deaths as the border between a large event and a 
catastrophe (1988, pl54). Yet, in terms of the horror of their 
impact upon us, there are differences between Bhopal (2500 
killed) or Chernobyl (5 to 10 000 early deaths) and 
Flixborough (28 killed) or Seveso (no immediate deaths) (HSE, 
1989; Weir, 1987, ppl89-194). Adjusting the boundary for 
catastrophic events downwards to 100 deaths would not 
significantly affect the argument below.
In the Netherlands a maximum acceptable group risk for >10 
deaths in one incident has been set at a maximum chance of 1 
in 10 000 (10_4) per year. But "a heavier weight is assigned to 
the larger consequences of accidents. It has been decided in 
this connection that a consequence n times greater must 
correspond to a chance n2 smaller, as it appears from 
literature that the seriousness of the societal consequence of 
an incident is judged to increase with the square of the 
number of people killed" (van Kuijen, 1988, p46). In fact the 
slope of this line means that the chance of 1 000 deaths is 1 
in 100 000 000 (10~8) and it can be seen from figure 5 that 
introducing a "catastrophic event zone" could have much the 
same effect in making a distinction between sizes of 
disasters. A chance of 1 in 10 000 000 per year with <10 
deaths is taken as posing a negligible group risk in the Dutch 
scheme.
It can be seen from figure 5 that relating the "physical" 
factors of chance and deaths is by itself insufficient to 
model acceptable risk. Nuclear power plants are well within 
the boundaries for acceptable risk while chemical and 
petroleum plants lie in the zone of unacceptable risk.
Aviation is included on the map because it is arguable whether 
all passengers freely choose to fly - business travellers or 
longhaul passengers have little practical alternative. 
Demonstrably, experience shows that aviation and chemical 
industries are considered socially acceptable risks, 
notwithstanding pressures to improve safety.
Our apparent conundrum is fairly easily solved, of course, 
once one adds the economic dimension. This is done in figure 
6, which takes the cost of providing an alternative to the 
advanced technological system as one (y) dimension. This map 
is derived from Perrow (1984, p349) but is significantly 
different in its treatment of the second (x) dimension. In 
Perrow, the cost of alternatives is plotted against net 
catastrophic potential, giving nuclear power a high rating on 
the latter score. Figure 6, by contrast, plots the chance of a 
catastrophic number of deaths, namely >1 000 per year from a 
single event. Adopting this dimension shows nuclear power 
plants with a low score - there being only a small chance of a 
large accident according to probabilistic risk assessment.
Since we can assume that the scales of each dimension of 
figure 6 measure increasing satisfaction - a remote risk or a 




























































































social indifference curves could potentially be drawn convex 
to the origin and downward sloping. Gains in utility can be 
supposed to exist through changing the mix of society's 
technology. Additional safety features for chemical plants 
would alter the form of technology while substituting fossil 
fuel power stations for nuclear power plants represents a 
change in mix. Different forms of technology carry with them, 
or embody, different risks.
By taking the midpoint of the (notional) index for the cost of 
alternatives and the maximum acceptable risk in respect of 1 
000 deaths (about 1 in 500 000 on the bottom axis), one can 
divide the map into quadrants. Each quadrant may be assigned a 
policy objective. Where the technology carries a high risk of 
catastrophe but a low penalty for its removal, a gain in 
social welfare could be achieved by following a goal of reject 
or abandon. With high risk but indispensable technologies, 
gains could be achieved only through risk reduction measures - 
a goal of control and improve. Technologies where risks are 
remote but costs of alternatives high, would not offer large 
prospects for social welfare gains - thus a policy goal of 
acceptance. Finally, a technology posing a remote risk but 
with a low penalty for removal could be the subject of a gain 
in social welfare by folowing a goal of avoidance.
It would be possible to substitute a y axis measuring the cost 
of harm for that shown in figure 6 (the cost of alternatives). 
However this would merely replicate the y axis of figure 5, 
but in monetary rather than physical units. In any case, the 
method of valuing life by reference to the cost of death or 
suffering to society as a whole (that is the loss of output 
plus cost of treatment) is of little help in determining 
society-wide decisions concerning the acceptability of risk. 
The values of life in such calculations reflect the prevailing 
form and mix of technology.
Thus the value of life is not appropriate as far as the trade­
off between societal risk and benefit is concerned. The 
relevant benefit (or cost) measure lies in the ability of 
society to switch technologies in meeting equivalent needs and 
demands. The advantage of figures 5 and 6 are that accident 
consequences are measured in physical units and cost/benefits 
in, at least in principle, ascertainable money terms, 
achievable through costing of engineering or of preferences 
for goods and services. Furthermore the maps focus concern 
upon society's capacity to control technology. Nevertheless it 
is admitted that marginalizing the monetary valuation of the 
social and~eeonojnic losses from major accidents in modelling 
what constitutes an acceptable societal risk is clearly 
controversial.
The models drawn here delineate the concept" of- acceptable risk 
according to two sets of dimensions: dimensions that measure 
social and economic factors and dimensions of risk (the chance 
of adverse consequences). Safety is revealed as their product. 




























































































measurable through the use of cost-benefit analysis and 
probabilistic safety analysis - are required if decisions 
concerning safety standards are to be made by society.
Who sets the standards?
On 15 September 1979 the members of the US President's 
Commission on the accident at Three Mile Island - the Kemeny 
Commission - discussed the question of acceptable risk.
Charles Perrow describes how the Commission arrived at its 
conclusion through an examination of the transcript (Perrow, 
1984, pp335-338). From their visit to the plant the Commission 
members inferred that industrial safety standards were much 
the same anywhere and that the plant appeared as well managed 
as any of the best: what could be more acceptable? However the 
potential consequences of a major accident clearly made 
nuclear power plants special. If this was the case should they 
not recommend far tighter management, along the lines of the 
US Navy, operating nuclear-powered submarines? Yet the 
prospect of imposing military-style discipline on civilian 
activity was clearly worrying. "But Professor Pigford," a 
former employee of a nuclear vendor and currently professor in 
nuclear engineering "would not let up. 'There is no such thing 
as no accidents', he said. 'So we have got to bite the bullet 
and realise that we are not going to be able to determine what 
is acceptable'. This became the majority view".
Whilst it is commonplace for the leaders of the nuclear 
industry, and indeed regulators, to point out that society 
accepts many activities, industrial or not, voluntary or 
involuntary, carrying far greater risks than those posed by 
the day to day operations of nuclear power plants, most are 
unwilling to take responsibility for saying what constitutes 
an acceptable risk. "Everyone takes it as normal that out of a 
population of ten million with one million cars there should 
be 2 000 accidents a year. But there would be panic if five 
-"died at Paks... Glasnost in the newspapers is a positive thing 
but there are some negative consequences: it is absurd for the 
press to suggest that there is such a thing as no risk... This 
[no risk] philosophy leads to growing risk in society - there 
are resources to lower risk but they are wasted on places 
where there is a small risk” (interview with Gyozo Wiegand, 
General Manager Technical Inspection, AEEF, on 17 November 
1988) .
The conclusion is that the public must be involved, but, 
suggests Perrow, only on the risk assessors' terms. "This is 
done by 'closing the gap between the expert and the public’ 
(that is, them and us); but the gap almost always is to be 
closed in one direction only - by bringing the public over to 
the experts' side through education" (Perrow, 1984, p315) . In 
the meantime nuclear power plants are planned, designed, 
constructed, licensed and operated. No-one wants to set a 
standard for acceptable risk - least of all politicians, who 
prefer to promote projects that are safe - but someone always 




























































































taken by engineers working within budget constraints.
It is possible to view the question of acceptable risk as a 
series of transfers of risks, benefits and responsibilities. 
Nuclear power plants pose risks that have a transboundary 
dimension : in space and time. Italians may have voted against 
nuclear power but the risks they face are those determined by 
the safety standards of Hungary or France. It may well be the 
case that half the postulated mutagenic effects of radiation 
will be revealed within two generations, but to conclude, as 
the ICRP does, that because the first generation is mainly 
concerned with its children and grandchildren no account need 
be taken of the latters' descendants is unwarranted (ICRP, 
1977b). Nor are the benefits spread fairly. Those rejecting 
nuclear power may still benefit from its use, such as 
electricity consumers in Italy who are supplied with cheaper 
French power. Those who suffer in the future may only bear the 
cost of nuclear waste and decommissioned reactors.
Responsibilities are transferred from the political process to 
technical experts, when they are asked to give an opinion on 
whether nuclear power plants are safe. 'Trans-scientific 
issues' concern "answers to questions which can be asked of 
science and yet which cannot be answered by science”
(Weinberg, 1972). It has been argued that scientists and 
engineers are particularly ill-qualified to make such 
discretionary, or value, judgements as a result of their 
training which encourages them to seek a positive (or 
negative) result, or answer, from an analysis or experiment 
(see Marcus, 1988, pl49).
But it is not just the 'big' questions of what constitutes 
safety that are transferred to technical experts. It is the 
job of a design engineer to make engineering judgements 
concerning safety margins. These are routine questions not 
generally open to validation except through the complexities 
of the licensing procedure. It will be recalled that most 
licensing is carried out on the basis of a deterministic 
approach, that is, an analysis aimed at ascertaining whether 
the design achieves the criteria for 'design basis accidents'. 
The discipline of probabilistic safety analysis is not yet 
mature enough to used as more than an adjunct to existing 
licensing procedures. Nevertheless these show (refer to figure 
5) that the margins of safety in nuclear engineering far 
exceed those of other industries. Probabilistic safety 
analysis is an extension of rationality into engineering 
judgement, it unmasks the pseudo-certainties of safety margins 
based on averages or rule of thumb and facilitates the 
comparison of engineered systems.
In the area of radiation protection safety standards are based 
upon levels of risk which are considered by the ICRP to be 
acceptable. The ICRP's comparators are other occupational 
hazards, with public exposure levels set an order of magnitude 
lower. Yet the ICRP have in fact developed a system to 




























































































optimization of protection according to the principle of 
ALARA.
Critics of ALARA and of the use of cost-benefit analysis, 
often from the Left but, as this paper has shown, commanding a 
good degree of consensus in representative forums such as the 
European Parliament and the Community's Economic and Social 
Committee, tend to offer technology-led criteria as a 
substitute. As methods of pollution control, rules requiring 
the use of best available technology or the state of the art, 
or designed to keep hazards as low as technically feasible, 
are quite popular. To a greater or lesser extent they are used 
in the environmental or safety regulation of the EC, Hungary, 
Italy and the UK. The nuclear industry however is not 
regulated according to such criteria.
Although in principle based on the practice of ALARA, 
investment in protection in the nuclear sector appears to be 
even higher than would be warranted by cost-benefit analysis. 
This-paper's analysis-©! those “examples where cost-benefit 
analysis has been carried out, of LWRs in Italy and the UK, 
bears out the comments made by a senior manager at Babcock 
Woodall-Duckham Limited, a power engineering company, to a 
professional symposium on ALARA. "Is the disparity between 
ALARA costing and the cost arising from applying nuclear 
industry design standards mainly due to the exceptionally high 
standards used in the nuclear field in comparison with those 
in general engineering..? In setting the safety margins ... 
extremely low risk probabilities are used - 10~6 to 10'7; this 
is disproportionate to normal safety standards as applied to 
the general engineering field, where levels of 10-3 to 10~1 
might be considered reasonable... If one applied safety levels 
to the nuclear industry more consistent with engineering 
practice, you would then find that ALARA would be ... much 
more significant. I am not suggesting that we should go for 
.those safety levels, but that surely is why that disparity 
'exists" (Lakey and Lewins, 1987, p80).
It is perhaps ironic that the nuclear industry which of nearly 
all advanced technological systems has come closest in 
practice to applying the best available technology should have 
been the most heavily criticised on safety grounds. In 
response the industry's leaders developed the concept of 
acceptable risk and the application of cost-benefit analysis 
and probabilistic safety analysis to measure safety 
performance. These tools open up the hitherto closed world of 
engineering judgement. The analysis presented in this paper 
has shown these tools to be flawed, but to reject them in 
favour of reliance upon technology-led criteria would be to 
hand back the choice on acceptable risk to the engineers and 
professional risk managers.
In particular, the flaws identified concern the calculation of 
the value of life and the need to assess the trade-offs for 
societal risks in a manner that accounts for catastrophic 




























































































calls into question society's ability to control technology.
In capitalist societies that control is weakened by private 
property rights. Under existing socialism the capacity of 
citizens to validate industrial decisions is underdeveloped.
Turning to the former issue, the methods used to calculate the 
value of life are income/wealth and risk perception biased. 
Many would wish to avoid making reference to 'the value of 
life' for just such reasons. However to use the term should 
remind us that lives are being weighed in the cost-benefit 
trade-off. The fact that measures of the value of life are 
arbitrary and problematic suggests that setting its value is 
part of the political process.
This is equally the case as regards occupational risk, where 
the value put on a worker’s life has to involve those 
affected; being a part therefore of the industrial relations 
process.
Thus the flawed nature of the tools for assessment of what 
constitutes an acceptable risk require not further expertise 
on the part of technical specialists, but input from the 
public and workers, in general from those who face the risks - 
and in the case of nuclear power plants, everyone is involved. 
The environmental movement and the developing concern over 
public and occupational health have introduced new values into 
what were until recently seen as technical questions. Fagnani 
and Nicolon put the issue well: "Do [these non-technical 
values] in practice open up a field of intervention in the 
process [of setting safety and environmental norms] simply to 
new forms of expertise as has previously been the case, or do 
they constitute a space where new forms of collective 
decision-making can be tried out, opening the way 
progressively from a system of delegated power to a system of 
participation?" (1979, p483).
Addressing this challenge cannot be a simple matter. Green and 
environmentalist opposition to nuclear power has aimed at a 
strategy of shut-down as soon as possible. But, however viable 
this strategy is within the context of national politics, it 
cannot deal with the transboundary nature of the risks if 
other nations opt to continue with nuclear power or embark on 
new programmes. Nor does it take into account the risks that 
remain after shut-down, risks faced by workers in 
decommissioning operations for example. There may also be 
inconsistencies in treatment where other hazardous 
technologies are involved, unless it is argued that these are 
to be closed down too. Thus it seems necessary to adopt a 
strategy that takes account of those factors which are avoided 
if the political approach remains aimed at securing a no risk 
society through shut-down.
Cost-benefit analysis and probabilistic safety analysis are 
decision-aiding tools for assessing the trade-offs underlying 
the concept of acceptable risk. Their use makes possible the 


























































































































































































Engineers design and build nuclear power plants, employing 
engineering judgement in the process. Safety is assured by the 
application of the principle of defence-in-depth. Regulators 
can assess the effectiveness of defence-in-depth by 
deterministic methods, but increasingly probabilistic safety 
analysis is employed. Use of probabilistic risk assessment 
allows the validation of safety goals, which may be expressed 
as radiation exposure targets. At such levels of radiation 
exposure, the harm threatened cannot be known for sure. The 
system of radiological protection therefore prescribes dose 
limits and a requirement to optimize the level of safety in 
order to keep exposure as low as reasonably achievable, 
economic and social factors being taken into account. Cost- 
benefit analysis is often proposed as the method by which this 
optimization is to be achieved.
Judging the acceptability of risk from a hazardous industrial 
technology involves making a trade-off between the potential 
for harm and the social benefits accruing. At the European 
level of safety regulation, such trade-offs are viewed as 
necessary and national regulators are encouraged by the 
European Community to employ cost-benefit analysis in this 
task. Such a system is in place in the UK, where cost-benefit 
analysis and probabilistic safety analysis have been used to 
validate the extent to which new nuclear power plants have 
sufficient defence-in-depth to meet the requirements of 
English law. In order to use cost-benefit analysis to assess 
investments in safety it is necessary to place a value on 
life. Such an exercise is likely to be at the expense of 
social consensus.
In Italy and Hungary no values are calculated for life as part 
of their regulatory processes and cost-benefit analysis is not 
Used to justify safety standards. Instead safety goals are set 
which are subject to validation by probabilistic safety 
analysis in Italy, and, it is intended, in Hungary. Safety 
standards are set in Italy by reference to the need to keep 
exposures as low as technically feasible, provided that this 
is effective and entails reasonable burdens. Hungarian safety 
standards require the consensus of organised social groups 
with the aim that nuclear energy serves the interests of 
society as a whole.
Such exposure targets and dose limits disguise the prior 
judgement made on the acceptability of risk. While overtly set 
according to engineering judgement or to maximum use of 
available technology, the state of the art or best practicable 
means, any safety standard implies the existence of some risk; 
it can therefore be said to represent an implicit view of 
acceptable risk. Yet even when the trade-off is explicitly 
made, as in cases where cost-benefit analysis is used, it is 




























































































For individual risk, it is suggested that a trade-off between 
the rTsk and the value of life is appropriate, although 
calculating the latter is a political not a technical issue.
Ill Lhe~ca'se' Of 5 O C16t~5X r 1S k~lT~ts "p r op os e d that the trade-off 
exists between catastrophic risk and the cost of switching to 
an alternative technology. This is also a political matter 
involving, as it does, society as a whole. Safety is modelled 
as the product of trade-offs between risk and measures of 
social and economic factors. These are measurable by 
application of cost-benefit analysis and probabilistic safety 
analysis.
The nuclear industry and its regulators have developed some 
powerful decision-aiding tools for risk management in their 
efforts to satisfy public demands that nuclear power plants be 
safe. In this enterprise the notion of safety has been changed 
to one of acceptable risk. But in so doing the door has been 
opened on the previously closed world of engineering and 
expert judgement. The challenge faced by citizens and workers 
is whether to seek to employ these decision-aiding tools or to 





























































































HISTORY OF PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT FOR NUCLEAR
POWER
Since the 1970s probabilistic risk assessment techniques have 
been applied to nuclear power technology.(See for example the 
seminal article by Chauncey Starr, former head of the Atomic 
Division of North American Aviation and subsequently president 
of the Electric Power Research Institute (Starr, 1969).) 
Developed from their application in defence and aerospace, 
patially encouraged by Robert McNamara's emphasis upon cost- 
benefit analysis in respect of procurement of weapons systems 
during his tenure at the US Defence Department, techniques 
such as event tree analysis were employed by the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission to examine reactor safety, most notably 
in its 'Rasmussen Report' (US NRC, 1975). The team of 150 
analysts, including a dozen Boeing Corporation engineers, 
tried to assess the probability of reactor core melt-down and 
the effects of such a catastrophe on the health of the 
surrounding population. Eighty-two event trees were analysed 
for a General Electric BWR and a Westinghouse PWR. Comparisons 
were made with other societal risks, though none from 
alternative means of energy supply.
The official evaluation of that study by the Lewis Committee 
recommended that the regulatory process explicitly incorporate 
more rational and cohesive methods, such as probabilistic risk 
assessment, for decision making (Lewis, 1978). Use of 
probabilistic risk assessment was further encouraged by the 
Kemeny Commission, established to review nuclear safety after 
the accident at Three Mile Island-2 on 28 March 1979 (Kemeny, 
1979). For the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission the lesson of 
TMI-2 was that although the health risks from severe reactor 
accidents were very small, the political and economic risks 
were not. Requiring the plant operator to undertake 
probabilistic risk assessment for beyond design basis 
accidents is intended to identify 'pronounced vulnerabilities' 
to severe accidents (Birkhofer and others, 1985, p54). The US 
NRC began to make use of probabilistic risk assessment in 
reactor regulation. Several studies using such techniques were 
carried out as a result, for instance by General Electric (see 
Speis and Jahns, 1985).
In Europe, the German risk study (Bayer and others, 1982) was 
undertaken to give an assessment of the accidental risks posed 
by nuclear power plants and to gain experience of applying 
this method. Whilst not part of the regulatory or licensing 
process, the Federal Parliament used its comparison of an 
existing PWR with a proposed fast reactor (SNR-300) to reject 
a petition to stop the latter's construction (CEC,1985). As 
part of its evidence to the public inquiry in the UK to 
contruct a PWR at Sizewell the plant operator put forward risk 
predictions of the risk from degraded core accidents based on 





























































































FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS
The following objectives for light water reactor nuclear power 
plants are intended by the Commission of the European 
Communities to form a framework which can be used as a 
reference for judgements made in the safety evaluation process 
to enable a consistent and uniform approach to be adopted 
(CEC, 1981).
1. Nuclear power plants shall be sited, designed, constructed, 
tested, operated and decommissioned so as to provide 
reasonable assurance there is no undue risk to the workers, 
the general public and the environment.
2. Measures shall be taken to ensure that radioactive 
materials which are present in the installations are confined 
in an appropriate manner.
3. The release of radioactive materials shall be as low as 
reasonably achievable.
4. Adequate steps shall be taken in the design, operation and 
decommissioning of the plant to ensure that all exposures to 
ionising radiations are as low as reasonably achievable.
5. Individual doses shall always be kept within prescribed 
limits. In addition individual and collective doses to both 
site personnel and the general public shall be kept as low as 
reasonably achievable in all operational states of the nuclear 
power plant.
6. All reasonably practicable steps shall be taken to prevent 
accidents.
'"7. All reasonably practicable 
the radiological consequences 
accident, should it occur.
8. All reasonably practicable 
the radiological consequences 
accident, should it occur.
steps shall be taken to minimize 
to the general public of any
steps shall be taken to minimize 
to site personnel of any
9. The more serious the potential consequences of an accident, 
the smaller should be the probability of its occurrence.
10. Provisions shall be made to prevent the exposure of site 
personnel reaching levels which hamper the actions necessary 
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AEEF Allami Energetikai es Energiabiztonsagtechnikai 
Feliigyelet - National Supervisory Authority of Energetics and 
Energy Safety (H).
AIB State Commissioning Committee (H).
ALARA An acronym for "as low as reasonably achievable, 
economic and social factors being taken into account". It was 
used for the first time in radiation protection in the ICRP's 
recommendations of 1965 in the slightly different form of "as 
low as readily achievable, economic and social factors being 
taken into account”.
ALARP An acronym for "as low as reasonably practicable".
Backfit To apply new requirements to previously approved 
reactors to bring them up to the same degree of compliance 
with the new regulations and new interpretations and guidance 
as state of the art reactors.
BWR Boiling Water Reactor; a LWR (USA).
Carcinogenic processes give rise to malignant tumours in 
cells (cancer).
CBI Confederation of British Industry (UK).
CEC Commission of the European Communities.
CEGB Central Electricity Generating Board (UK).
CIPE Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione 
Economica - Inter-ministerial Committee for Economic Planning 
( I )  .
Committed dose equivalent is the dose to an organ or a tissue 
over a period of 50 years.
CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
Cost-benefit analysis A dedision-aiding technique of applied 
welfare economics, which is used to throw light on the social 
desirability of undertaking a project. The positive and 
negative effects of the project are usually evaluated in money 
terms, despite the difficulties in assigning values to 
individual preferences or to "goods" and "bads" not traded on 
a market. If the net benefit is positive it is implied that 
those who gain from the project would be able to compensate 
those who lose and still remain better off. Such compensating 
variations are income biased and problems of distributional 
equity exist.
Design basis accident A fault or fault sequence is said to be 




























































































account in the design and for which it has been demonstrated 
by virtue of the safeguard system provided that neither a loss 
of coolable geometry nor release of radioactivity exceeding 
off-site exposure limits to the environment would result.
DISP Direzione Centrale Siccurezza Nucleare e Protezione 
Sanitaria - Directorate of Nuclear Safety and Health 
Protection (I).
EC European Community.
Effective dose equivalent is the sum of the weighted average 
dose equivalent in the various organs or tissues. It is 
measured in sieverts.
ENEA Comitato Nazionale per la Ricerca e per lo Svilluppo 
dell'Energia Nucleare e delle Energie Alternative - National 
Commission for Research and Development in Nuclear and 
Alternative Energy Sources (I) .
ETUC The European Trade Union Confederation.
Euratom The European Atomic Energy Community.
European Community Directives, et cetera. When acting under 
the Rome Treaties the Council of Ministers and the Commission 
of the European Communities issue:
Regulations of general application; these are 
binding in their entirety and applicable in all 
Member States;
Directives are binding on Member States to which 
they are addressed as regards the results to be 
achieved, but leave the form and methods of 
achieving them to the discretion of the national 
authorities;
Decisions may be addressed to a government, or to an 
enterprise or to a private individual; they are 
binding in their entirety on those to whom they are 
addressed;
Recommendations and Opinions are not binding.
Factors of magnitude The standard set of prefixes used in
science include:
Factor Prefix Abbreviation
1-millionth part micro V (IO-*)1-thousandth part milli m (IO*»)
thousand times kilo k (10n )
million times mega M (10*)
thousand million times giga G (109)





























































































Genetic effects caused by radiation involve harm to the 
descendants of the exposed individual.
Harm is the loss of health to a person.
Hazard is the situation that in particular circumstances 
could lead to harm.
Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social 
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity 
(WHO Constitution).
HSC and HSE The Health and Safety Commission and Executive 
respectively (UK).
IAEA The International Atomic Energy Agency.
ICRP The International Commission on Radiological Protection.
Ionising radiations produce ionisation in matter - the 
process by which a neutral atom or molecule acquires an 
electric charge.
ISS Istituto Superiore di Sanita - Supervisory Institute of 
Health (I) .
LD50 The median lethal dose to an exposed population.
LWR I.ight water reactor; a nuclear reactor that Uses water as 
both a moderator and a coolant.
MICA Ministerio dell'Industria del Commercio e
dell'Artigianato - Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Crafts
(I) .
MSzMP Magyar Szocialisztai Munkai Part - Hungarian Socialist 
Workers' Party.
Multi-attribute utility analysis A decision-aiding technique 
of decision theory (or decision analysis) concerned with how 
to evaluate options where there are conflicting objectives. It 
uses a scoring system (or a utility function) for the relevant 
factors (the attributes) with the property that if the score 
(or utility) is the same for two options there is no 
preference for one or the other, but if scores differ then the 
option with the higher score is preferred. Generally the best 
outcome or lowest adverse consequence for each factor j is 
assigned a utility Uj of 1 and the worst consequence a utility 
of 0. Each option i has various sub-scores associated with it 
and assuming that these are independent of each other they can 
be summed to give a total utility for each option Ui. The 
utility function need not be linear and can be expressed in an 
additive form. Optimization using this technique requires that 




























































































factors to be traded-off against one another. Assigning the 
score or weights to the relevant factors is problematic.
Mutagenic effects involve changes in the genetic material of 
somatic or germ cells whereby their successors differ in a 
permanent and heritable way from their predecessors.
NRPB The National Radiological Protection Board (UK).
Occupational health should aim at the promotion and 
maintenance of the highest degree of physical, mental and 
social well-being of workers in all occupations; the 
prevention among workers of departures from health caused by 
their working conditions; the protection of workers in their 
employment from risks resulting from factors adverse to 
health; the placing and maintenance of workers in an 
occupational environment adapted to their physical and 
psychological equipment; and, to summarise, the adaption of 
work to the person and of each person to their job (based on 
WHO statement).
OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development.
OSART An Operational Safety Review Team of the IAEA.
PAV Paksi Atomeromu Vallalat - Paks Atomic Power Plant 
Company (H).
PEN Piano Energetico Nazionale - National Energy Plan (I).
Probabilistic Risk Assessment is the act of quantifying an 
expected average risk based on observed and calculated 
component and human failure rates in engineered systems and 
the anticipated consequences associated with these failures.
Probabilistic Safety Analysis systematically examines 
expected performance and failure to obtain estimates of the 
risk and consequence of a hazard. It is more general than 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment and involves normative 
evaluations of, for instance, benefit/detriment and the equity 
of risk distribution.
PUN Progretto Unificato Nucleare - Standardised Nuclear 
Programme (I).
PWR Pressurised-Water Reactor; a LWR (USA).
Risk The likelihood of a particular undesired event occurring 
within a specified period or in specific circumstances. Risks 
exist when objectively known probabilities can be attached to 
a range of possible outcomes. Risk is the product of the 
probability of occurrence and the magnitude of the 
consequences (severity) of the event, should it happen.




























































































pressure-tube reactor; like a LWR but with a graphite 
moderator (USSR).
Sievert (Sv) A unit of radiation dose which incorporates 
adjustments to take account of the different characteristics 
of various radiations and the different sensitivities of body 
tissues.
SNUPPS Standardised Nuclear Power Plant System (USA).
Somatic effects caused by radiation involve harm to the 
individual exposed. The ICRP divides these into non-stochastic 
effects (which occur only if a substantial threashold dose is 
exceeded) and stochastic effects (where only the induction of 
a malignant disease is likely to be significant).
SSN Servizio Sanitario Nazionale - National Health Service 
(I) .
SzOT Szakszervezetek Orszagos Tanacsa - Central Council of 
Trade Unions (H).
Teratogenic effects involve damage to the embryo (that is, 
after fertilisation) causing congenital malfunction or organ 
malfunction.
THORP Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant, at Sellafield (UK). 
TMI Three Mile Island (USA).
TUC Trades Union Congress (UK).
Uncertainty exists when there is more than one possible 
outcome to a particular course of action; the form of each 
possible outcome (state of the world) is known but the chance 
or probability of getting one particular outcome is not known.
USL Unita Sanitarie Locali - Local Health Units of the SSN
(I) .
VEIKI Institute for Electrical Power Research (H).
VVER Vodo-vodiannyi Energetichesky Reaktor - Pressurised 
water and moderated reactor; a LWR (USSR).
Watt A measure of power or the rate of energy flow.














































































































































































































































































































































ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF THE APPLICATION OF COST- 
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